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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
BOYD A. WARD
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Appellant,
vs.

CASE NO. 890347

RICHFIELD CITY, a municipal
corporation, et. al»

Category No. 13

Defendants/
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BRIEF OF APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE DECISION OF THE
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
AND
THE SIXTH DISTRICT COURT FOR SEVIER COUNTY
HONORABLE DON V. TIBBS, JUDGE

George E. Brown, Jr.
Attorney for Plaintiff/
Appellant
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Telephone: (801) 562-5555
Ken Chamberlain
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Telephone:
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LIST OF PARTIES
PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT:
BOYD A. WARD,
DEFENDANTS/RESPONDENTS:
1.

RICHFIELD CITY, a municipal corporation;

2.
RICHFIELD CITY COUNCIL, a political subdivision of the
State of Utah;
3.
KENDRICK HARWARD, individually and in his official
capacity as Mayor of Richfield City and as a member of the City
Council;
4.
GLEN OGDEN, individually and in his official capacity
as a member of the Richfield City Council;
5.
KAY KIMBALL, individually and in his official capacity
as a member of the Richfield City Council;
6.
REX WARENSKI, individually and in his official capacity
as a member of the Richfield City Council;
7.
DUANE WILSON, individually and in his official capacity
as a member of the Richfield City Council;
8.
NAD BROWN, individually and in his official capacity as
a member of the Richfield City Council;
9.
WOODY FARNSWORTH, individually and in his official
capacity as a member of the Richfield City Council.
(Rule 24 (d), Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, provides that
references to "appellant" and "respondents" shall be kept to a
minimum to promote clarity; however, in this case the
Defendants/Respondents are very diverse in nature, i.e.
municipal corporation, mayor, city council, council members. In
light of this diversity, it appears that clarity will be
promoted by referring to Defendants/Respondents hereafter as
"Respondents.")
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GROUNDS ON WHICH SUPREME COURT JURISDICTION IS INVOKED
On October 26, 1989, the Supreme Court granted the
Appellant's Petition for Writ of Certiorari.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
ISSUE I;
THE DISTRICT COURT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
NOT VOIDING ALL ACTS OF THE RESPONDENTS TAKEN ON
JUNE 8, 1981, WHICH WERE IN VIOLATION OF THE TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER WHICH THE DISTRICT COURT RULED WAS
EFFECTIVE TO JUNE 17, 1981.
ISSUE II:
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN RELYING UPON UTAH CODE ANN.
SECTION 10-6-32 (1953) TO GRANT RESPONDENTS MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENY WARD'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT BECAUSE THE STATUTE WAS REPEALED BY THE UTAH
STATE LEGISLATURE IN 1977, AND, THEREFORE, IS NOT
APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE WHICH AROSE IN 1981.
ISSUE III;
THE DISTRICT COURT AND COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING
THAT RESPONDENTS DID NOT HAVE TO LIST ALL MATTERS THEY
INTENDED TO CONSIDER ON THE AGENDA OF THE RICHFIELD
CITY COUNCIL MEETING AS REQUIRED BY UTAH CODE ANN.
SECTION 52-4-6 (1953).
ISSUE IV;
THE TRIAL COURT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
VOIDING THE ACTION OF RESPONDENTS TO TERMINATE THE
EMPLOYMENT OF WARD WHICH ACTION WAS TAKEN IN A CLOSED
MEETING IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. SECTIONS 52-4-3
AND 52-4-6 (1953).
ISSUE V:
THE TRIAL COURT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
RULING THAT WARD DOES NOT HAVE A RIGHT TO APPEAL HIS
TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANN.
SECTIONS 10-3-1105 AND 10-3-1106 (1953).
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
ISSUE VI;
THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS ISSUED A DECISION IN CONFLICT
WITH DECISIONS OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT AND HAS
DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS BY IGNORING THE STIPULATED FACTS AND FACTS
SET FORTH BY APPELLANT AND BY RELYING UPON THE FACTS OF
RESPONDENTS IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT'S SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AGAINST THE APPELLANT.
ISSUE VIII;
THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS SPECIFICALLY RULED
THAT WARD WAS A MEMBER OF THE RICHFIELD CITY POLICE
DEPARTMENT, BUT HAS INCORRECTLY DENIED HIM THE RIGHTS
OF APPEAL EXTENDED TO ALL MEMBERS OF THE POLICE
DEPARTMENT BY THE RICHFIELD CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT
POLICIES AND PROCEDURES MANUAL.
ISSUE IX;
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE
INCONSISTENT DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT REGARDING THE
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER WHICH WAS VIOLATED BY THE
RESPONDENTS.

STATUTES, RULES AND REGULATIONS
Copies of all Statutes, Rules and Regulations are set forth
in full in the Addendum to this Brief.
STATUTES:
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended:
Section 10-3-909
Section 10-3-911
Section 10-3-916
Section 10-3-918 through 10-3-919
Section 10-3-924 through 10-3-926
Section 10-3-1001 through 10-3-1013
Section 10-3-1105 through 10-3-1106
Section 10-6-32
Section 52-4-1 through 52-4-9 (Open and Public Meetings Act)
RULES AND REGULATIONS;
Richfield City Police Department Policies and Procedures
Manual

•*

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action by Appellant Boyd A. Ward, a dismissed
marshal of Richfield City, a third class city, for general
damages, punitive damages, reinstatement, award of back pay and
benefits, attorney's fees, and other relief deemed appropriate
by this Court.
This case was initiated by Ward in June of 1981 when he
obtained a Temporary Restraining Order (Record, pages 9 and 10)
from the Honorable Don V. Tibbs, Sixth District Court Judge, and
filed a Verified Complaint (Record, pages 1 to 8) against
Respondents challenging the firing of Ward as marshal or chief
of police of Richfield City.

All of the Respondents were served

with a Temporary Restraining Order prior to a special city
council meeting held on June 8, 1981. Thereafter, a hearing for
a preliminary injunction was held before the Honorable Don V.
Tibbs on June 17, 1981.

In that hearing the District Court

ruled that pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 10-3-911 (1953) it
had no jurisdiction to interfere with the actions of Richfield
City (Record, pages 57 and 58).
PRIOR DISPOSITION IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
Thereafter, Ward appealed the first decision of the District
Court to the Supreme Court, Ward v. Richfield City, 716 P.2d 265
(Utah 1984).

This Court ruled that Utah Code Ann. Section

10-3-911 (1953) did not pertain to Richfield City, a third class
city, and, therefore, the District Court did have jurisdiction.
The case was remanded to the District Court on April 16, 1986,
for further proceedings upon its merits.
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DISPOSITION IN THE DISTRICT COURT
On July 30, 1986, the District Court heard Ward's Motion for
Change of Venue, Motion to Amend the Complaint, Motion for
Preliminary Injunction, and Motion for Summary Judgment*

The

Court also heard Respondents' Motion for Summary Judgment.

The

Court denied Ward's Motion for Change of Venue, granted Ward's
Motion to Amend the Complaint, denied Ward's Motion for
Preliminary Injunction, and ruled the original Temporary
Restraining Order terminated on June 17, 1981, (Record, pages
391 and 392). The District Court took under advisement the two
Motions for Summary Judgment and subsequently denied Ward's
Motion and granted Richfieldfs Motion (Record, pages 386 to
388).

Copies of both Orders are in the Addendum.

Ward appealed

the decision of the District Court to the Utah Supreme Court.
The Utah Supreme Court transferred the case to the Utah Court of
Appeals.
DISPOSITION IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
District Court and entered the decision on June 14, 1989, Ward
v. Richfield City, 776 P.2d 93 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

On July

10, 1989, the Court of Appeals denied Ward's Petition for
Rehearing.

Subsequently, the Utah Supreme Court granted Ward's

Petition for Writ of Certiorari.

Ward hereby requests that this

Court reverse the decisions of the Utah Court of Appeals and the
District Court and enter judgment in favor of Ward.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
While Ward was marshal of Richfield City, Respondents caused
an agenda to be prepared and distributed which listed the
anticipated activities for the Richfield City Council meeting on
April 2, 1981; however, the agenda did not contain the
information that Respondents were going to consider terminating
Ward as marshal.

Respondents went into a closed meeting and all

members of the public who were in attendance at the open meeting
were excluded from the closed meeting.

Kent Colby, an

individual who was excluded from the closed meeting, requested
that Respondents contact him in the event the closed meeiting
ended so that he could be present if Respondents took any
further action affecting the community.

In the closed meeting

Respondents discussed terminating Ward as marshal.

Respondents

did not advise the public that they were going back into open
meeting.

Respondents entered the termination of Ward in the

minutes of the City Council meeting after the closed meeting was
concluded.

Ward was terminated as marshal or chief of police,

effective on April 3, 1981. On April 6, 1981, Ward submitted to
Respondents a written request for a hearing to appeal his
termination.

Respondents did not allow Ward a hearing to appeal

his termination.
On Tuesday, June 2, 1981, Ward advised Respondents he
intended to take legal action to challenge his termination.

On

Friday, June 5, 1981, at approximately 5:30 p.m., Respondents
caused notice to be given to the local newspaper, The Richfield
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Reaper, and the local radio station, KSVC, that a non-scheduled
city council meeting was to be held on Monday, June 8, 1981, at
8:00 a.m.

On June 8, 1981, prior to the city council meeting,

Respondents were served with a Temporary Restraining Order by
which Respondents were "ORDERED that the defendants, and each of
them, be and they are hereby temporarily restrained and enjoined
from taking any further action against plaintiff by way of
terminating plaintiff's services as chief of police of Richfield
City."

Respondents, after being served the Temporary

Restraining Order, took action against Ward to terminate him as
chief of police of Richfield City by attempting to ratify the
previous action taken by Respondents in the closed meeting on
April 2, 1981.
In the initial hearing before the trial court on June 17,
1981, the parties stipulated to specific facts. These
stipulated facts are set forth below and reference is made to
the pages of the record where the stipulations are found:
1.

The agenda for the April 1, 1981, Richfield City

Council meeting did not state that the Respondents were going to
terminate of Ward as chief of police (Record, page 47).
2.

During the Richfield City Council meeting, Respondents

went into a closed meeting (Record, page 47).
3.

At the time that the Richfield City Council went into

closed meeting, the members of the public that were in
attendance at the open meeting were excluded from the closed
meeting (Record, page 47).
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4.

Kent Colby, the representative of KSVC Radio Station

who was a member of the public present at the city council
meeting when the Richfield City Council went into the closed
meeting, requested that he be contacted so that he could be
present if Respondents went back into open meeting to transact
any further business (Record, pages 48 and 49).
5.

The Respondents did not communicate to Colby that they

were going back into open meeting to transact further public
business so that Colby could be present (Record, pages 48 and
49).
6.

Ward was terminated as chief of police at the April 2,

1981, meeting by the Richfield City Council effective April 3,
1981 (Record, page 50).
7.

Termination of Ward as chief of police was entered on

the minutes of the city council meeting after the closed meeting
was concluded (Record, page 50).
8.

On Tuesday, June 2, 1981, the Respondents, through

their attorney, were advised that Ward intended to take action
pursuant to the Utah Open and Public Meetings Act (Record, page
51 ).
9.

On Friday, June 5, 1981, at approximately 5:30 p.m.,

notice of an unscheduled Richfield City Council meeting to be
held on Monday, June 8, 1981, at 8:00 a.m. was given by the
Respondents to the local newspaper, Richfield Reaper, and the
local radio station, KSVC (Record, page 51).
10.

On Monday, June 8, 1981, prior to the unscheduled

meeting, the Respondents were served a Temporary Restraining
Order providing as follows:

It is ordered that the defendants and each of them be and
they are hereby temporarily restrained and enjoined from
taking any further action against plaintiff by way of
terminating plaintiff's services as Chief of Police of
Richfield City. (Record, pages 51 and 52.)
11.

The Respondents, after having been served the Temporary

Restraining Order, violated the Temporary Restraining Order and
took action against Ward to terminate him as chief of police
(Record, page 52).
ADDITIONAL FACTS
The District Court allowed Ward to file an amended complaint
(Record, pages 360 to 375, 391 and 392). The amended complaint
set forth an alternative cause of action that if Ward
was legally fired that he was entitled to a hearing to appeal
the firing.

Since the trial court granted Respondents1 Motion

for Summary Judgment, all of the facts alleged by Ward must be
viewed in a light favorable to Ward.

The pertinent facts

alleged by Ward are set forth below:
12.

On April 6, 1981, Ward submitted to Richfield City a

written request for a hearing pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
Sections 10-3-1105 and 10-3-1106 (1953) to appeal his
termination as chief of police (Record, pages 293 to 300 and
page 373, Exhibit "B").
13.

Ward did not receive a hearing in response to his

written request to appeal his termination (Record, pages 293 to
299).
14.

The Richfield City Council enacted the Richfield City

Police Department Policies and Procedures Manual which was in
effect on April 2, 1981 (Record, pages 328 to 331, Exhibit " D M ) .
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
ISSUE I
The District Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order
prohibiting the Respondents from taking action to terminate Ward
as chief of police.

On June 8, 1981, the Respondents violated

the Temporary Restraining Order by terminating Ward as chief of
police of Richfield City.

Subsequently, the District Court

speicfically ruled that the Temporary Restraining Order was
effective until June 17, 1981. Therefore, the District Court
and the Court of Appeals erred in not voiding the actions of the
Respondents on June 8, 1981, that were in violation of the
Temporary Restraining Order issued by the District Court.
The Supreme Court should void the actions of the Respondents
which were in violation of the Temporary Restraining Order of
the District Court.
ISSUE II
The District Court relied upon Utah Code Ann. Section
10-6-32 (1953) in the Order granting Respondents' Motion for
Summary Judgement.

The statute had been repealed in 1977, which

was four years prior to the acts of the Respondents in 1981
which gave rise to this lawsuit.

The decision of the District

Court granting the Summary Judgment and the decision of the Utah
Court of Appeals affirming the Summary Judgment should be
reversed on the basis of manifest error.
ISSUE III
The Respondents did not list on the agenda for the April 1,
1981, city council meeting that Respondents were going to

consider terminating Ward as chief of police.

The Utah Open and

Public Meetings Act contained in Utah Code Ann.# Title 52,
Chapter 4, in particular Section 52-4-6 (1986) specifically
requires that a city council must provide 24 hours notice of the
agenda of the meeting.
business."

The agenda contained the term "other

Nevertheless, the reference to "other business" was

not sufficient to give adequate notice of the intent of the
Respondents to terminate Ward as chief of police. Therefore,
the District Court and the Court of Appeals erred in not voiding
the action of the Respondents in terminating Ward because the
Respondents failed to list the item of business on the
statutorily required agenda.

The Supreme Court should rule that

the Respondents action is void.
ISSUE IV
The Utah Open and Public Meetings Act, Utah Code Ann. Title
52, Chapter 4, in particular Section 52-4-4 specifically
prohibits any ordinance, resolution, rule, regulation, contract
or appointment to be enacted at a closed meeting.

The

Respondents entered into a closed meeting, and while in the
closed meeting, terminated Ward as chief of police. The
District Court and the Court of Appeals erred in not voiding the
action of the Respondents firing Ward in a closed meeting.

The

Supreme Court should rule that the firing of Wad is void because
it was done in a closed meeting.
ISSUE V
Ward, as a marshal in a third class city, has a right of
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sections 10-3-1105 and
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10-3-1106 (1953).

The Respondents refused to give Ward an

appeal of his termination after he requested it in writing.

The

District Court and the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the
action of the Respondents denying Ward a hearing to appeal his
termination.

The Supreme Court should reverse that decision.
ISSUE VI

Appellate procedure requires that an appellate court must
review a Summary Judgment granted by a trial court and all facts
involved in a light favorable to the appellant.

However, in

this casei the Court of Appeals has not only disregarded the
facts stipulated to by both parties, but has relied upon facts
supplied by the Respondents to uphold the Summary Judgment
against the Appellant.

The Supreme Court should reverse the

decision of the Court of Appeals because of this departure from
normal appellate procedures.
ISSUE VII
The Utah Legislature enacted the Utah Open and Public
Meetings Act in Utah Code Ann., Title 52, Chapter 4.

In Section

52-4-1, the Legislature specifically set forth the intent of the
Act.

However, the District Court and the Court of Appeals has

subsituted their own discretion in place of the written intent
of the Legislature.

Therefore, the Supreme Court should reverse

the decision of the Court of Appeals and the District Court.
ISSUE VIII
The Utah Court of Appeals in its decision affirming the
Summary Judgment against Ward, specifically held that Ward was a
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member of the Richfield City Police Department,

However, the

Court of Appeals then proceded to deny Ward the right to appeal
his termination pursuant to the Richfield City Police Department
Policies and Procedures Manual.

It is inconsistent for the

Court of Appeals to rule that although Ward was a member of the
police department, he did not have a right of appeal pursuant to
the

policies and procedures manual because he was chief of

police.

The decision of the Court of Appeals should be reversed

and a ruling entered that Ward had a right of appeal, not only
statutorily, but also pursuant to the policies and procedures
manual.
ISSUE IX
The District Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order
which terminated on June 17, 1981. However, on June 8, 1981,
while the Temporary Restraining Order was in effect, the
Respondents violated the Temporary Restraining Order by
terminating Ward as chief of police.

Nothwithstanding the

specific direction of the District Court that the Temporary
Restraining Order terminated on June 17, 1981, neither the
District Court nor the Court of Appeals voided the action of the
Respondents when they violated the Temporary Restraining Order
on June 8, 1981. A municipality should not be allowed to
violate any Order of a court of competent jurisdiction.

The

Utah Supreme Court should reverse the decisions of the District
Court and the Court of Appeals and rule that the actions of the
Respondents on June 8, 1981, in violation of the Temporary
Restraining Order are void.
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ARGUMENTS
ISSUE I
THE DISTRICT COURT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
VOIDING ALL ACTS OF THE RESPONDENTS TAKEN ON JUNE 8,
WHICH WERE IN VIOLATION OF THE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
WHICH THE DISTRICT COURT RULED WAS EFFECTIVE TO JUNE
1981.

NOT
1981,
ORDER
17,

A review of the transcript of the June 17, 1981, hearing
(Record, pages 57 through 58) clearly shows that the District
Court did not address the merits of the Temporary Restraining
Order. The District Court ruled that it had no jurisdiction.
Therefore, having ruled that it had no jurisdiction, the
District Court could not address the merits of the Temporary
Restraining Order until the Supreme Court remanded the case in
April of 1986 in Ward v. Richfield Cityf 716 P.2d 265 (Utah
1984).

Accordingly, the District Court had jurisdiction to

determine when the Temporary Restraining Order terminated.

The

District Court ruled that the Temporary Restraining Order
terminated on June 17, 1981.
In any event, it is obvious from the October 22, 1986, Order
(Record, pages 391 and 391) of the District Court that the Court
never ruled the Temporary Restraining Order to be invalid.
Moreover, the Order of the District Court provided that the
Temporary Restraining Order was effective to June 17, 1981.
However, neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals
voided the action of Respondents on June 8, 1981 (nine days
prior to June 17, 1981) terminating Ward as chief of police.
Consequently, the city council meeting of the Respondents on
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June 8# 1981# should be declared void and in violation of the
Temporary Restraining Order.
ISSUE II
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN RELYING UPON UTAH CODE ANN.
SECTION 10-6-32 (1953), TO GRANT RESPONDENTS1 MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENY WARD'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT BECAUSE THE STATUTE WAS REPEALED BY THE UTAH STATE
LEGISLATURE IN 1977, AND, THEREFORE, IS NOT APPLICABLE TO
THIS CASE WHICH AROSE IN 1981.
The stipulated facts clearly establish that this case arose
in 1981. The Order granting Richfieldfs Motion for Summary
Judgment (Record, pages 386 to 388) cites Utah Code Ann. Section
10-6-32 (1953), as the controlling statute to justify the
ruling.

The statute states as follows:

10-6-32. Term of Appointed Officers -Removal.Except as otherwise provided by law, the term of
office of all appointive officers in cities shall be
until the municipal election next following their
appointment unless they are sooner removed by the
board of commissioners of cities of the first and
second class, or in cities of the third class by the
mayor with the concurrence of a majority of the
members of the city council, or by the city council
with the concurrence of the mayor.
(Attached in the Addendum is a copy of the above statute.)
However, Section 10-6-32 was repealed in 1977. Utah Code Ann.
Section 10-1-114 (1953), enacted in 1977, provides in part as
follows:
10-1-114. Repealer.
The following acts, chapters, titles, and
sections are repealed except as provided in Section
10-1-115:
(1) Chapters 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 14 of Title
10,...
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A review of the current compiler's notes in the Utah Code
further clarifies that Section 10-1-114 repealed section 10-6-32
in 1977. Chapter 3 of Title 10 is the current source of
statutes which pertain to the case at hand*
Since Section 10-6-32 was repealed in 1977 and this case
arose in 1981, the trial court erred in relying upon Section
10-6-32 in ruling against Ward.

The Supreme Court should

reverse the Order of the trial court on the basis of manifest
error.
ISSUE III
THE DISTRICT COURT AND COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
RULING THAT RESPONDENTS DID NOT HAVE TO LIST ALL
MATTERS THEY INTENDED TO CONSIDER ON THE AGENDA AS
REQUIRED BY UTAH CODE ANN. SECTION 52-4-6 (1953).
Utah Code Ann. Section 52-4-6 (1953), provides that a city
council must provide 24 hours notice of the agenda of the meeting:
(2) In addition to the notice requirements of
subsection (1) of this section, each public body
shall give not less than 24 hours1 public notice of
the agenda, date, time and place of each of its
meetings. (Emphasis added.)
As stipulated by the parties, Respondents did not cause the
agenda of the Richfield City Council meeting to state that
Respondents would consider terminating Ward as marshal.

Neither

Ward, nor any other member of the public had any opportunity to
voice opinion about the termination of Ward as marshal because
no one, except Respondents, knew that the matter would be
considered.

Moreover, as established by the stipulated facts,

neither Ward nor any other member of the public knew what was
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happening after Respondents went into the closed meeting.

Under

these circumstances, there is absolutely no way that Ward or any
other member of the public could have known or opposed the
actions of Respondents.

Therefore, Respondents violated Section

52-4-6 of the Utah Open and Public Meetings Act.
In the Record at pages 290 to 291 is the affidavit of Boyd
Adams.

Adams was the marshal or chief of police in American

Fork City, Utah.

The American Fork City Mayor intended to

appoint another individual as marshal.

The intention to fire

Adams was listed on the agenda for the American Fork City
Council meeting; however, the citizens of American Fork voiced
their opinions that they wanted to keep Adams as the marshal.
Consequently, the Mayor and City Council reappointed Adams to
the position.

Not only is Adam's affidavit on point, but the

experience of Adams illustrates why it is very important that
all items of public business be specifically listed on the
agenda in order for the public to know what is happening at a
city council meeting.
Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary defines the word
"agenda" as follows:

"a list, outline, or plan of things to be

considered or done."

In other words, the agenda, as intended by

the statute, is the document stating the things which will be
considered or done by a public body.

It is more than a notice

of the time and place of the meeting.

Furthermore, Utah Code

Ann. Section 52-4-1 (1953) states as follows:
Declaration of Public Policy.
In enacting this chapter, the legislature finds
and declares that the state, its agencies, and
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political subdivisions, exist to aid in the conduct of
the people's business. It is the intent of the law that
their actions be taken openly and that their
deliberations be conducted openly. (Emphasis added.)
Therefore, the public would not have notice of the public
business to be conducted by a city council unless everything is
listed in detail on the required agenda.
In June of 1978, the Office of the Attorney General
published the Utah Open and Public Meetings Act Manual.
Beginning at page 19 of the manual are the following questions
and answers:
Question No. 23. What are the notice requirements of
the Utah Open and Public Meetings Act?
Answer: The right of citizens to attend meetings of
public bodies and to make their views known to said public
bodies upon issues of general or limited public importance
requires they be given an oportunity to know in advcince when
and where such meetings are to be held and the matters to be
considered thereat. Thus Section 54-4-6, Utah Code
Annotated 1953, as most recently amended by the 1978 Budget
Session of the Utah Legislature, provides for the following
notice requirements for annually scheduled meetings, all
meetings, and emergency meetings:
Annually Meeting Schedule. Any public body which
holds regular meetings scheduled in advance over the* course
of a year shall give public notice at least once each year
of its annual meeting schedule specifying the date, time and
place of such meetings.
All Meetings. In addition to the annual meeting
schedule, each public body shall give not less than 24
hours1 public notice of the agenda, date, time and place of
each of its meetings.
Emergency Meetings. If unforeseen circumstances make
it necessary for a public body to hold an emergency meeting
to consider matters of an emergency or urgent nature*, the
foregoing 24 hour public notice requirement may be
disregarded and "the best notice practicable given."
However, no emergency meeting shall be held unless an
attempt has been made to notify all members of the public
body and a majority thereof votes to hold such meeting.
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The "public notice" required in all meetings except
emergency meetings# is satisfied by: (1) posting written
notice at the principal office of the public body, or if no
such office exists, at the building where the meeting is to
be held; and (2) providing notice to at least one newspaper
of general circulation within the geographic jurisdiction of
the public body, or to a local media correspondent.
***

Question No. 26: What circumstances would justify an
emergency meeting under the Act?
Answer: Since the notice and agenda of each meeting of
a public body must ordinarily be posted and delivered at
least 24 hours before the actual meeting, there may occur
unforeseen circumstances requiring action by the public body
which will not permit such notice* Under these
circumstances the legislature has provided that the public
body can hold an emergency meeting to consider such
emergency or urgent matters by giving "the best notice
practicable." In the opinion of the Attorney General, an
emergency meeting must be related to an item which was which
was truly unforeseen at the time of the posting and delivery
of the next regular meeting agenda and such item must be of
such an emergency or urgent nature that immediate action is
required.
Question No. 27: What would constitute "the best
notice practicable" for an emergency meeting of a public
body under the Act?
Answer: If the emergency matter arises during a
regular meeting of the public body it should be scheduled
for consideration at an "emergency meeting" upon a majority
vote of the public body, after which absent members thereof
should be notified or an attempt should.be made to notify
them of such emergency emeting. In addition, the "best
notice practicable" should be given to the press or media of
the date, time, place and purpose of such emergency
meeting. Such notice could be verbal or written, as
circumstances warrant, but written notice would be
preferable if possible... Thus, the notice requirements for
"emergency meetings" should be the same as those for regular
meetings whenever circumstances permit. Only when regular
notice requirements cannot reasonably be met would anything
less constitute the "best notice practicable" under the
Act. Emergency meeting procedures should be used only when
absolutely necessary.
Thus, it is very clear from the manual that all items to be
considered by a city council must be listed on the agenda.
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These requirements may be relaxed in the event of an emergency
situation; however, if an emergency develops during a regularly
scheduled city council meeting and the matter is not on the
agenda, the public body must give the "best notice practicable"
before considering the emergency.

Consequently, Respondents

could not legally terminate Ward on April 2, 1981, because the
matter was not listed on the agenda and no notice of any kind
was given to the public.

It was necesary for Respondents to

list the matter on the agenda for the next city council meeting
or, if it was necessary, give other "practicable notice."
A statement such as "other business," which the Respondents
had on the agenda, is not sufficient to meet the notice
requirement.

If such a statement were sufficient, public bodies

would be tempted to give themselves large salaries, enter into
unfavorable financial obligations or do other things which the
general public would not approve of or accept under the term
"other business."
Call v. West Jordan, 727 P.2d 180 (Utah 1986), stresses the
importance of municipalities complying with statutory
requirements.

Therefore, this court should reverse the decision

of the District Court and the Court of Appeals and rule that
Respondents could not terminate Ward without listing the
intended action on the agenda for the city council meeting.
ISSUE IV
THE TRIAL COURT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
VOIDING THE ACTION OF RESPONDENTS TO TERMINATE THE
EMPLOYMENT OF WARD, WHICH ACTION WAS TAKEN IN A CLOSED
MEETING IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. SECTIONS 52-4-3 AND
52-4-6 (1953).
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The Utah Open and Public Meetings Act is contained in Utah
Code Ann* Title 52, Chapter 4.

Section

52-4-9 provides as

follows:
(2) A person denied any right under this chapter may
commence suit in a court of competent jurisdiction to compel
compliance with or enjoin violations of this chapter or to
determine its applicability to discussions or decisions of a
public body. The court may award reasonable attorney fees
and court costs to a successful plaintiff. (Emphasis added.)
Respondents violated the procedural safeguards established
by the State of Utah for conductng public business.

Section

52-4-4 states as follows:
A closed meeting may be held upon the affirmative vote
of two-thirds of the members of the public body present at
an open meeting for which notice is given pursuant to
Section 52-4-6; provided, a quorum is present. No closed
meeting is allowed except as to matters exempted under
Section 52-4-5; providedf no ordinancef resolutionf rulef
regulation, contractf or appointment shall be approved at a
closed meeting. The reason or reasons for holding a closed
meeting and the vote, either for or against the proposition
to hold such a meeting, cast by each meember by name shall
be entered on the minutes of the meeting. (Emphasis added.)
An examination of the minutes of the meeting (Record, pages 341
to 345) definitely shows that the Respondents did not list the
reason for the closed meeting on April 2, 1981, nor did they
list by name the council members voting in favor of the closed
meeting.

Thereafter, there is a statement that a minute entry

was made after executive session, but nothing in the minutes
shows that a vote was taken to go into open meeting after the
closed meeting was concluded, nor is there anything to indicate
that the closed meeting was properly terminated.
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Respondents caused all members of the public to be excused
from the city council meeting (Record, page 47). Neither Ward
nor any member of the public was advised that Respondents were
going back into an open meeting to take action against Ward
(Record, pages 48 and 49)j therefore, the Respondents were still
in a secret or closed meeting.

Thus, the resolution

passed by

the Respondents was in violation of Section 52-4-4 of the Utah
Open and Public Meetings Act.
As has been referred to previously in this Brief, Boyd Adams
was marshal in American Fork City, Utah.
appoint another person as marshal.

The mayor intended to

However, the citizens of

American Fork City voiced their opinion that they wanted to keep
Adams as the marshal to the extent that the mayor and city
council reappointed him to the position.

Therefore, in light of

the experience of Adams, it is essential that public bodies not
be allowed to enact resolutions in closed meetings.
Ward calls the Court's attention to the minutes for May 7,
1981 (Record, pages 346 to 349) wherein Item 5 states:
5.
MINUTES. It was decided that the minutes of the
last meeting would not be approved until a later date
after Ken Chamberlain, City Attorney, had reviewed them.
The purpose of minutes is to record what actually transpired in
the city council meetings and not what should have transpired.
The mintues for May 28, 1981, Item 3 (Record, pages 350 to 353)
state as follows:
3. MINUTES REVIEWED. The mintues of the April 2, 1981,
meeting were reviewed. Ken Chamberlain had previously
reviewed the minutes and clarified the minute entry.
Nad Brown motioned that the minutes of the April 1, 1981,
meeting be approved with the changes stated. Kay Kimball
seconded the motion. The motion carried unanimously...
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It is interesting to note that the minute entry indicates
that the city attorney clarified the minute entry.

There is

nothing in the April 2, 1981, minutes (Record, pages 341 to 345)
to indicate that the city attorney was present at the meeting so
that he would have the knowledge to add any appropriate
clarifications.

Respondents either conducted the meeting

according to the correct procedures, or they did not.
The Utah Supreme Court has dealt with the Open and Public
Meetings Act in Common Cause of Utah v. Utah Public Service
Commission, 598 P.2d 1312 (Utah 1979).

In that case this Court

determined that the Utah Public Service Commission could use
closed meetings for deliberation purposes.

Nevetheless, this

Court determined that even the Utah Public Service Commission,
with its unique need to deliberate in private, had to conform
with the Open and Public Meetings Act in any final orders and
formal actions by issuing these decisions in a meeting open to
the public.

The Court stated at page 1315 as follows:

Whether the "decision making" phase is accomplished
in such a private meeting, or in private deliberations,
it is to be observed that the statute further provides
that at such a closed meeting, "no ordinance, resolution,
rule, regulation, contract, or appointment shall be
approved." In conformity with that statute, any final
and formal action of the Commission on such matters should
be announced or issued in a meeting open to the public.
Court in other jurisdictions have established similar
precedents.

In the case of Ahnert v. Sunnyside Unified School

Dist. No. 12, 126 Ariz. 473, 616 P.2d 933 (Ariz. App. 1980), the
Arizona Court of Appeals held that a school board action taken
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in a closed meeting was void.
similar to the case at hand.

The Arizona case is strikingly
The school district had two

separate meetings; the first meeting was definitely a closed
meeting in which it was decided to hire a particular edvtcational
consultant and the second meeting was properly publicized and
began as an open meeting.

However, at approximately 6:50 p.m.

the school board went into an executive session.

At the time it

went into the closed meeting it stated that it would reconvene
into an open meeting if necessary to take any action that might
be needed as a result of the closed meting.

At page 935, the

court determined the following pertaining to the first closed
meetingf "The decision in this case, however, was made during a
closed meeting and did not comply with the legislative intent."
Discussing the second meeting which was called to ratify the
first closed meeting, the Court stated at page 935 as follows:
The announcement that the meeting would reconvene "if
necessary" did not give sufficient public notice as to
the time and place of the reconvened meeting. The
board's resolution to ratify its previous actions at
the reconvened meeting of June 21 therefore was void.
In short, the Arizona Court voided all of the decisions of the
school board which were made in violation of the Arizona open
meetings laws.
In the case of Pokorny v. City of Schuyler, 202 Neb. 334,
275 N.W.2d 281 (Neb. 1979), the Nebraska Supreme Court held that
the decision of the City of Schuyler to buy real estate was void
when the decision was made in two consecutive meetings which
violated the open meetings laws.
as follows:

24

At page 285 the court stated

The effect of the invalidity of the meetings of March 16 and
March 25 is the same as if the meetings had never occurred.
No action authorized at those meetings could be sustained by
reliance upon the proceedings of the council at those
meetings.
Therefore, the Nebraska Supreme Court held that the decisions of
the two meetings were void just as if the two meetings had never
been held.
This Court has ruled in Call v. West Jordan, 727 P.2d 180
(Utah 1986), that an ordinance of the City of West Jordan was
invalid because city officials did not follow statutory
requirements in enacting the ordinance.

Therefore, the Supreme

Court should reverse the decision of the District Court and the
Court of Appeals and rule that the action of Respondents in
terminating Ward as marshal was void because it violated Section
52-4-3 (prohibiting resolutions to be made ina a closed
meeting).

Ward should be awarded back pay, back benefits,

attorney's fees, costs, and damages.
ISSUE V
THE TRIAL COURT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING
THAT WARD DOES NOT HAVE A RIGHT TO APPEAL HIS TERMINATION
OF EMPLOYMENT PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANN. SECTIONS 10-3-1105
AND 10-3-1106 (1953).
Ward filed an amended verified complaint (Record, pages 360
to 375) with an additional cause of action which is an
alternative cause of action in which Ward alleged that the
Respondents improperly denied Ward an appeal of his firing.

The

issue that a marshal in a third class city is entitled to appeal
firing is extremely important, not only affecting Ward, but all
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marshals and police officers in third class cities. Ward
contends that, if legally fired, he has the right to a hearing
to appeal that firing.
In the case of Ward v. Richfield, 716 P.2d 265 (Utah 1984),
this Court stated at page 266 that the legislature had made a
distinction between first and second class cities and cities of
the third class pertaining to police as set forth in Utah Code
Ann. as follows:
1.

First and Second Class Cities:
a.

Section 10-3-909 requires first and second class

cities to "create, support, maintain and control a police
department."
b.

Sections 10-3-913 through 10-3-915 set forth the

duties and powers of the chief of police and police officers in
first and second class cities.
c.

Sections 10-3-1001 through 10-3-1013 create the

Civil Service Commission to hear the appeals of fired members of
the police departments, fire departments and health departments
in cities of the first and second class.
2.

Third Class Cities:
a.

Section 10-3-918 provides for the chief of police

or marshal in third class cities and assistants to the chief of
police or marshal.
b.

Section 10-3-919 conveys upon the chief of police,

marshals, and their assistants in cities of the third class the
rights and duties respectively conferred upon such officers in
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first and second class cities in Sections 10-3-913 through
10-3-915.
c*

Sections 10-3-1105 and 10-3-1106 create the

Appeals Board to hear the appeals of fired appointed officials
and municipal employees (including marshals and their
assistants) in cities of the third class,
Thusf it is clear that the Utah Legislature has enacted two
distinct sets of statutes which pertain to the termination and
appeal process for municipal employees*

The first set of

statutes are Sections 10-3-1001 through 10-3-1013 which pertain
to the police departments and fire departments of cities of the
first and second class.

These statutes establish the discharge

and appeal procedures for members of those departments.

It

should be noted that in the case of Worrall v. Ogden City Fire
Department, 616 FP.2d 598 (Utah 1980), the Utah Supreme Court
ruled that a person discharged from a department must be
informed of his right to a hearing.
The statutes cited above pertain to the Civil Service
Commission and specifically refer to "departments."

As noted

above, Section 10-3-909 requires each city of the first and
second class to establish a "police department."

On the other

hand# Section 10-3-918 authorizes a third class city to appoint
assistants to the marshal.

Although a third class city may

refer to its marshal and police officers as "a department," for
the purpose of these statutes and the appeal procedures, only
first and second class cities have "police departments"
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while

third class cities have a chief of police or marshal and
assistants.

It is important to recognize the distinction by

which organizations are defined as "departments." Otherwise,
confusion can be created when reviewing the two separate methods
of appeal.
The second set of statutes which pertain to municipal
employees are Sections 10-3-1103 through 10-3-1107. These
statutes are referred to as Personnel, Rules and Benefits.
Section 10-3-1105 states as follows:
All appointive officers and employees of
municipalities, other than members of the police
departmentsy fire departments, heads of departmentsP and
superintendents, shall hold their employment without
limitation of time, being subject to discharge or dismissal
only as hereinafter provided. (Emphasis added.)
Utah Code Ann. Section 10-3-1106 sets forth the procedures
for appeal of discharge or transfer.

Section 10-3-1106 (2)

requires a written notice of the appeal within ten (10) days
after the discharge.

The subsequent subparagraphs set forth the

procedures and time frames of the appeal process.

Subparagraph

(5) provides in part, "in no case shall the appointive officer
or employee be discharged or transferred when appeal is taken,
except upon a concurrence of at least a majority of the
membership of the governing body of the minicipality."

Ward was

discharged on April 2, 1981, and on April 6, 1981 (Record, pages
300 and 373, Exhibit "B"), submitted his written request for
appeal.

Respondents did not provide Ward a hearing in response

to his written request for an appeal hearing (Record, pages 293
to 300).
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Therefore, it is the contention of Ward that a marshal or
chief of police in a third class city and all of the police
officers who are appointed as assistants to the chief of police
have the right to appeal their termination pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. Sections 10-3-1105 and 10-3-1106. Analyzing the
Legislature's use of the word "department" as pertaining
specifically to police, fire and health "departments" in first
and second class cities whose rights of appeal are covered in
Sections 10-3-1001 through 10-3-1013, it becomes clear that
there are two separate sets of statutes pertaining to the
appeals of municipal employees and that Ward has the right to
appeal the termination of employment pursuant to Sections
10-3-1105 and 10-3-1106.
It should be noted that Section 10-3-911, which was the
subject of the original appeal to the Supreme Court in this
case, was repealed by the Legislature in 1987. Now there is
only one municipal employee position which can be terminated
without any recourse.

This Court is referred to Sections

10-3-924 through 10-3-926 which provide for the appointment,
term of office, and duties of a city manager.

Section 10-3-925

provides as follows:
The manager shall serve at the pleasure of the governing
body except that the governing body may employ the manager
for a term not to exceed three years. The term of
employment may be renewed at any time. Any person serving
as manager of a municipality under this section may be
removed with or without cause by a majority vote of the
governing body. (Emphasis added.)
The Utah Legislature has provided for the appeal of all
municipal emplyees, whether they are members of a department or
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not, with the exception of the city manager.

However, in

providing that the city manager serves at the "pleasure of the
governing body," the Legislature has made its intent clear that
there is no appeal process for the city manager.

Therefore, it

should be ruled that the termination of the marshal of a third
class city is governed by lthe appeal procedures of Section
10-3-1105 and 10-3-1106.
In the case of Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Rothy
408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972), the United
States Supreme Court stated at 92 S.Ct. 2709 as follows:
Certain attributes of "property" interests protected by
procedural due process everge from these decisions [cases
cited in previous paragraph]. To have a property interest
in a benefit, a person clearly must have more that an
abstract need or desire for it. He must have more that a
unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a
legitimate claim of entitlement to it. It is the purpose of
the ancient institution of property to protect those claims
upon which people rely in their daily lives, reliance that
must not be arbitrarily undermined. It is a purpose of the
constitutional right to a hearing to provide an opportunity
for a person to vindicate those claims.
Property interests, of course, are not created by the
Constitution. Rather they are created and their dimensions
are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem
from an independent source such as State law
rules or
understandings that secure certain benefits and that support
claims of entitlement to those benefits. Thus, the welfare
recipients in Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, had a claim of
entitlement to welfare payments that was grounded in the
statute defining eligibility for them. The recipients had
not yet shown that they were, in fact, within the statutory
terms of eligibility. But we held that they had a right to
a hearing at which they might attempt to do so.
In the case of Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 92 S.Ct.
2694, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972), the United States Supreme Court
stated as follows at 92 S.Ct. 2700:

-*n

We disagree with the Court of Appeals insofar as it held
that a mere subjective "expectancy" is protected by
procedural due process, but we agree that the respondent
must be given an opportunity to prove the legitimacy of his
claim of such entitlement in light of "the policies and
practices of the institution." 430 F.2d, at 943. Proof of
such a property interest would not, of course, entitle him
to reinstatement. But such proof would obligate college
officials to grant a hearing at his request, where he could
be informed of the grounds for his nonretention and
challenge their sufficiency.
Therefore, in light of the decisions of the United States
Supreme Court and the prior decisions of the Utah Supreme Court,
it is clear that if Respondents acted legally to fire Ward, Ward
has a right to a hearing to protect his property interest in
continued employment.
It is not the intention of Ward to argue that a third class
city cannot discharge its marshal for cause.

Nevertheless, Ward

argues that Respondents should follow the hearing and appeal
process for appointive officers and employees as set forth in
Utah Code Ann. Sections 10-3-1105 and 10-3-1106.
Again, Ward cites this Court in Ward v. Richfield Cityf 716
P.2d 265, 266 (Utah 1984), which states:
"It probably is not wholly inaccurate to suppose that
ordinarily when people say one thing they do not mean
something else." 1AC Sands, Sutherland Statutory
Construction, Section 47-01 as cited in Hansen v. Wilkinson,
Utah, 658 P.2d (1983). We construe a statute on the
assumption that each term is used advisedly and that the
intent of the legislature is revealed in the use of the term
in the context of the structure in which it is place.
Therefore, Ward respectfully requests that this Court rule
that the District Court and the Court of Appeals erred in ruling
that Ward does not have a right to appeal his termination
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sections 10-3-1105 and 10-3-1106.
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ISSUE VI
THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS ISSUED A DECISION IN CONFLICT WITH
DECISIONS OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT AND HAS DEPARTED FROM
THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS BY
IGNORING THE STIPULATED FACTS AND FACTS SET FORTH BY
APPELLANT AND RELYING UPON THE FACTS OF THE RESPONDENTS IN
AFFIRMING THE DISTRICT COURT'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST THE
APPELLANT.
When a Judgment is entered pursuant to a Motion for Summary
Judgment/ the Court of Appeals, or any appellate court, must
analyze the Judgment in a light favorable to the facts of the
Appellant and, basically, accept the facts of the Appellant as
being true; however, the Court of Appeals in its opinion has
relied upon and cited several facts set forth by the Respondents
and contested by the Appellant.

Moreover, the facts relied upon

by the Court of Appeals are contradicted by the stipulated
facts, which stipulated facts are binding upon both the parties
and the Court.
On page two of the decision of the Court of Appeals (the
decision is set forth in the Addendum), the Court stated, "The
Council was concerned about several recent resignations within
the Police Department."

The Appellant disputed the allegation

that there had been recent resignations.

There had been

resignations or terminations of six officers over a period of
six years.
police.

Some had taken place prior to Ward becoming chief of

Moreover, in the Record at pages 281 to 288 is the

Affidavit of John Bettfruend disputing the allegations.
Bettfruend was the acting chief of police after Ward was
dismissed and had previously been a police officer in Richfield.
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Bettfruend stated that he was not aware of any threats of
officers who intended to resign.
Of particular importance is the first footnote on page 3 of
the copy of the Court of Appeals' decision found in the Addendum
hereto.

The footnote reads as follows:

1•
Prior to the closed session, the Council asked whether
anyone present wanted to be notified if open session resumed.
Most of those present were members of the media and they
responded that they did not necessarily desire to return, but
wanted to be advised if action were taken.
The Court of Appeals took the statement in footnote one directly
from either the Affidavit of Respondents Kendrick Harward or
Woody Farnsworth.

In the court Record at page 229, Respondent

Harward stated:
All media representatives were asked if they wanted to be
notified if open session resumed. All responded in words or
to the effect that "we do not necessarily want to return but
if action is taken, advise us what action the Council
takes."
In the Record at page 238, Respondent Farnsworth made the exact
same statement.

It is obvious that footnote one was obtained by

the Court of Appeals directly from the Affidavits of the
Respondents.
In contrast to footnote one and the affidavits of the
Respondents, is the Affidavit of Kent Colby, a media member who
was present at the city council meeting.

Colbyfs Affidavit is

located at pages 277 to 279 of the Record.

The Affidavit of

Colby was submitted in opposition to the Respondents' Motion for
Summary Judgment.

In part, Colby's Affidavit states as follows:

4.
That affiant asked the Mayor and City Council if
they would come back into session. The general response was
that they would not come back into session unless they

needed to take any action. Woody Farnsworth, Richfield City
Manager and one of the defendants herein, replied that he
didn't think the council would take any action that night,
but if it did it would be significant. Farnsworth inquired
of affiant if affiant wanted to be contacted if the City
Council were to take any action. Another member of the City
Council stated that the executive session would not last
very long and that affiant and the representative from the
Richfield Reaper could wait if they desired.
5.
That affiant told Farnsworth that affiant wanted
to be present if the City Council took any action and
requested that affiant be called. Farnsworth indicated that
affiant would be called.
6.
That affiant and the reporter for the Richfield
Reaper, who were excused from the closed session, thought
the meeting would be short and stayed outside for
approximately an hour waiting for it to end. While waiting
outside, the affiant and the other reporter speculated about
the subject of the closed meeting because neither knew what
the Richfield City Council was considering.
7.
That after approximately one hour of waiting
without any word from the City Council, affiant and the
reporter from the Richfield Reaper left to go home.
8.
That at approximately 11:30 p.m. affiant received
a phone call from Farnsworth, a defendant herein, whereby
Farnsworth read the prepared press release to affiant
stating that Boyd Ward had been fired as Chief of Police of
Richfield City.
9.
That at no time after affiant was excused from the
closed meeting and had requested to be notified in order to
be present if the City Council was going to take any action,
did he receive any other communication from the City Council
other than the 11:30 p.m phone call announcing that Boyd
Ward had been fired as chief of police.
Obviously, the above facts from the Affidavit of Colby are in
direct contradiction to the facts as stated by the Respondents
and as relied upon by the Court of Appeals.
Of greater significance is the conflict between the facts
relied upon by the Court of Appeals and the facts to which the
parties stipulated in open court before the District Court
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Judge.

These stipulated facts are binding not only upon the

parties, but also upon the Court.

The stipulated facts are as

follows:
4.
Kent Colby, the representative of KSVC Radio
Station, who was a member of the public present when
Richfield went into closed meeting, requested that he be
contacted so that he could be present if Respondents went
back into open meeting to transact any further business
(Record, pages 48 and 49).
5.
The Respondents did not communicate to Colby that
they were going back into open meeting to transact further
public business so that Colby could be present (Record,
pages 48 and 49).
These stipulated facts are extemely significant.

Utah Code

Ann. Section 52-4-4 (1953) of the Utah Open and Public Meetings
Act in part specifically states, ft.. .provided, no ordinance,
resolution, rule, regulation, contract, or appointment shall be
approved at a closed meeting..."

Therefore, if one member of

the public specifically requested to be present when the
Respondents went back into open session and the Respondents did
not communicate that they were going back into open session, the
Respondents were still in a closed meeting because the public
could not be present.

Therefore, the Respondents were

specifically prohibited by law from passing any resolution.
The minutes of the city council meetings in the Record in
this case show that all of the Respondents' decisions were done
in the form of a resolution.

A resolution is specifically

prohibited by the statute from being enacted in a closed
meeting.

Therefore, if the Respondents were in a closed

meeting, any resolution was in violation of the Utah Open and
Public Meetings Act (Utah Code Ann. Section 52-4-1, et. seq.).
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In support of Ward's position and in opposition to the
Respondents1 Motion for Summary Judgment was an Affidavit of
Boyd Adams (Record, pages 290 and 291), a former chief of police
in American Fork City.

The Affidavit clearly indicated that the

agenda of the American Fork City Council stated that it was
going to consider terminating Adams as chief of police.

In

response to the notice of the agenda, the public rallied behind
Adams and caused the City Council to keep him on as the chief of
police.

This is a very significant fact opposing the

Respondents1 Motion for Summary Judgment.

When the people know

what a public body is going to do, they can significantly
influence the public body.
on point with this case.

The Affidavit of Adams is completely

In its analysis the Court of Appeals

should have made the assumption that the citizens of Richfield
could have rallied behind Ward as the public rallied behind
Adams.

Subsequent to this termination, Ward was elected to the

office of Constable, demonstrating his popularity with the
citizens.
It is very interesting to note that at page 3 in the
decision of the Court of Appeals that it specifically found
that, "The Council concluded the closed meeting with a unanimous
vote, one member abstaining, to discharge Ward.

Minutes of the

closed meeting were recorded and when the Council resumed open
session a formal vote to discharge Ward was taken.ff
added.)

(Emphasis

Thus, the Court of Appeals found that a decision to

terminate Appellant was made in the closed meeting.
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The Utah

Supreme Court has clearly stated that an appellate

court must review the facts of the party against whom Summary
Judgment has been granted in a manner most favorable to him.
Morris v. Farnsworth Motel, 123 Utah 289f 259 P.2d 297 (1953);
Young v. Texas Co.f 8 Utah 2d 206# 331 P.2d 1099 (1958); Brandt
v. Springville Banking Co., 10 Utah 2d 350, 353 P.2d 460 (1960);
Bridge v. Backmanf 10 Utah 2d 366, 353 P.2d 909 (1960); Allen's
Prods. Co. v. Glover, 18 Utah 2d 9, 414 P.2d 93 (1966); Geneva
Pipe Co. v. S & H Ins. Co.f 714 P.2d 648 (Utah 1986); Berube v.
Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989).
The Court of Appeals has not analyzed this case in a light
favorable to the facts of the Appellant.

In view of the

Appellant's facts and the stipulated facts, it is obvious that
Respondents did not publish an agenda and give notice that Ward
would be fired.

Furthermore, it is obvious that the Respondents

actually made the decision in a closed meeting.

Both actions

violate the Utah Open and Public Meetings Act.

Moreover, the

Affidavit of Adams establishes what can happen when public
notice is given.

Thus, on the basis of the facts asserted by

Appellant and the stipulated facts, this Court should reverse
the decision of the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE VII
THE DECISIONS OF THE DISTRICT COURT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS
SUBSTITUTED THEIR OWN DISCRETION FOR SPECIFIC LEGISLATIVE
INTENT OF THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF UTAH BY ALLOWING
RESPONDENTS TO VIOLATE THE UTAH OPEN AND PUBLIC MEETINGS
ACT.
The District Court and the Court of Appeals in their
respective opinions have raised the question, "What is in the
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public interest?"

The legislature in Utah Code Ann, Section

52-4-1 (1953) answers that question as follows:
In enacting this chapter the legislature finds and
declares that the State, its agencies and political
subdivisions, exist to aid in the conduct of the people's
business. It is the intent of the law that the action of
public bodies be taken openly and that the deliberations be
conducted openly.
It is an abuse of discretion for both the District Court and
the Court of Appeals to substitute their perceptions of what is
best for the public instead of upholding the written intent of
the Legislature that the people's business must be deliberated
and conducted openly.

Thus, Ward respectfully argues that it is

in the public interest for Respondents to comply strictly and
completely with statutory procedures and with orders of the
courts.

It is not in the best interest of the people for any

public body to violate statutes and court orders.

Furthermore,

the written intent of the Legislature should be upheld.
ISSUE VIII
THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS SPECIFICALLY RULED THAT
WARD WAS A MEMBER OF THE RICHFIELD CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT,
BUT HAS INCORRECTLY DENIED HIM THE RIGHTS OF APPEAL EXTENDED
TO ALL MEMBERS OF THE POLICE DEPARTMENT BY THE RICHFIELD
CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT POLICIES AND PROCEDURE MANUAL.
Although Ward has argued that he has a statutory right to
appeal his firing, he argues that he also has a right to appeal
his termination pursuant to the Richfield City Police Department
Policies and Procedures Manual.

The Richfield City Council

enacted the Richfield City Police Department Policies and
Procedures Manual on January 8, 1981. A copy of the minutes of
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the city council meeting for January 8, 1981, are found at pages
238 through 331 of the Record.

The policies and procedures set

forth in the manual were in effect at the time Ward was
terminated from his position as marshal on April 2, 1981 .
Specifically, Subsection W. of the policies and procedures
manual provides as follows:
W.

Appeals -

A member of the department may request a reveiw of
disciplinary action by submitting a written request to the
Chief of Police. Additional appeal procedures may be
followed in the Richfield City Personnel Policies and
Procedures Manual (sic).
Dismissals are subject to appeal to the Richfield City
Appeals Board. Procedures for such appeals are outlined in
the Richfield City Personnel Policies and Procedures Manual
(sic).
Richfield's policies and procedures provide for an appeal to
the Richfield City Appeals Board.

Utah Code Ann. Section

10-3-1106 is the source of authority for the Appeals Board.
Section 10-3-1106 (1) specifies in part:
...he shall have the right to appeal the discharge or
transfer to a board to be known as the appeal board which
shall consist of five members, three of whom shall be chosen
by and from the appointive officers and employees, and two
of whom shall be members of the governing body. (Emphasis
added.)
Consequently, the Respondents have adopted Utah Code Ann.
Sections 10-3-1105 and 10-3-1106 as the precedure by which
appeals and hearings will be conducted for the marshal and the
police assistants in the City of Richfield.
The Court orf Appeals in footnote 4 at page 6 of the
decision summarily stated that the Richfield City Police
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Department Policies and Procedures Manual does not pertain to
the chief of police.

However, in its decision the Court of

Appeals also specifically held that Ward was a member of the
department.

Therefore, there is a significant contradiction in

the reasoning of the Court.
A similar matter was addressed by this Court in the case of
Berube v. Fashion Centref Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989).

The

Berube Case, supra, placed great importance upon a policy and
procedure manual.

The case makes it clear that an employer is

expected to abide by the terms of its policy manual.

Associate

Chief Justice Howe's concurring opinion, with which Chief
Justice Hall concurred, states at page 1050:
I concur only in the results of Parts IV and V deeming it
not necessary or appropriate here to go beyond the written
policy manual of the employer, which I view as being part of
the total employment contract.
At page 1052, Justice Zimmerman (in his concurring in the
result opinion) stated:
In this context, the representations made by the employer in
employee manuals, bulletins, and the like are legitimate
sources for determining the apparent intentions of the
parties.
In the case at hand, Respondents had enacted the Richfield
City Police Department Policies and Procedures Manual which
specifically allowed for appeals of termination.

Subparagraph W

of the Manual states, "Dismissals are subject to appeal to the
Richfield Appeals board.

Procedures for such appeals are

outlined in the Richfield City Personnel Policies and Procedures
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Manual (sic)."

Ward was an employee of Richfield City.

Certainly as a member of the police department, as so held by
the Court of Appeals, he was entitled to an appeal. Thus, any
employee of Richfield City who is fired has the right to appeal
to the Richfield City Appeals Board pursuant to procedures
enacted by the Richfield City Council.

The District Court and

the Court of Appeals were in error in denying Ward the right to
appeal his termination.

Therefore, in addition to the statutory

right of appeal as set forth in Utah Code Ann. Sections
10-3-1105 and 10-3-1106, Ward should be entitled to the appeal
process as created by the Richfield City Police Department
Policies and Procedures Manual.

Consequently, this Court should

reverse the decision of the District Court and the Court of
Appeals.
ISSUE IX
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE INCONSISTENT
DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT REGARDING THE TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER WHICH WAS VIOLATED BY THE RESPONDENTS
In the Order granting Summary Judgment (Record, pages 386
and 387), dated September 29, 1986, the District Court provided
that it would not be in the public interest to disturb the
actions of Respondents on April 2, and June 8, 1981. However,
in its Order (Record, pages 391 and 392, a copy of which is in
the Addendum) dated October 22, 1986, subsequent to the Order
granting Summary Judgment, the District Court stated as follows:
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that the plaintiff's
Motion for Preliminary Injunction is denied, and it is
specifically ordered that the Temporary Restraining Order
terminated on June 17, 1981. the date of the first hearing
before this Court. (Emphasis added.)

On June 8, 1981, Respondents held their non-scheduled city
council meeting of which one of the purposes was to terminate
Ward as chief of police.

However, prior to commencing the June

8, 1981, meeting, the Respondents were served with the Temporary
Restraining Order prohibiting them from taking any further
action against Ward*

Moreover, the parties stipulated before

the District Court, as indicated in the statement of facts at
the beginning of this Brief, as follows:
11. Respondents, after having been served the Temporary
Restraining Order, violated the Temporary Restraining Order
and took action against Ward to terminate him as chief of
police (Record, page 52).
It is totally clear that the District Court terminated the
Temporary Restraining Order on June 17, 1981. Therefore, it was
in effect on June 8, 1981, and furthermore, as stipulated by the
parties, it was violated by the Respondents.

Consequently the

actions in violation of the Temporary Restraining Order should
be voided.
The District Court certainly has the discretion to grant or
terminate a temporary restraining order.

Nevertheless, once the

District Court had ruled that the Temporary Restraining Order
was in effect until June 17, 1981, all actions of the
Respondents in violation of the Temporary Restraining Order
should be void ab initio.

Richfield City, its mayor, and its

city council, exist as a result of law enacted by the Utah State
Legislature.

Richfield City would not exist as a municipality

except for the laws creating the various subdivisions of the
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State of Utah.

Therefore, an entity that exists as a result of

law, should not only abide by all the requirements of law, but
it should also abide by all orders issued by a court of
competent jurisdiction.
Undoubtedly, the Respondents expected the citizens of their
community to comply with all ordinances and resolutions enacted
by the Respondents.

Furthermore, if.the citizens did not comply

with duly enacted ordinances, the judicial system would be
utilized to rule upon any violation of ordinances and the
consequences thereof.

Thus, the municipality itself should be

expected to comply with all statutes of the State of Utah and
comply with all orders of a court of competent jurisdiction.
Not only does a municipal body have great power over the
citizens within its boundaries, but it has a great
responsibility to uphold the trust of the citizens.

There

should be absolutely no question that a public body would do
everything possible to comply with law and to set the example
for the citizens to comply with law and with the orders of the
judiciary.
The District Court specifically terminated the Restraining
Order on June 17, 1981.

The Respondents violated the Temporary

Restraining Order on June 8, 1981. Richfield City and all its
officials exist as a result of the laws of the State of Utah.
Consequently, the Respondents should not be allowed to erode the
legal authority of the District Court by violating a Temporary
Restraining Order.

Respondents should be expected to set an
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example of complying with law and with court orders. The
Supreme Court should uphold the judicial authority of the Courts
to issue a Temporary Restraining Order upon a public body and
the need for the public body to comply with the Order*
CONCLUSION
From the beginning of this controversy, Respondents, without
notice to the public or an agenda, have consistently handled the
termination of Ward in a manner without regard to due process,
requirements of statutes, equal protection or, for that matter,
without regard to fair play.

Respondents initially chose not to

list on the required agenda that they would consider terminating
Ward and then they excluded all members of the public from the
city council meeting to consider the discharge of Ward.
Thereafter, in the dark of night, Respondents fired Ward.
requested, in writing, an appeal of that discharge.
was completely and totally ignored by Respondents.

Ward

The appeal
Ward was

popular enough to be elected the Sevier County Constable.
Perhaps Respondents were fearful that the public in a regularly
scheduled city council meeting with an adequate agenda would
object to the discharge of Ward or that an appeal board would
refuse to uphold the termination of Ward.
The Respondents are composed of the following entities: a
municipal corporation, mayor, city council, and individual
councilmen.

These entities and individuals represent all of the

people in the community.

The Respondents have the power to

exercise great control over the lives of the people whom they
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represent. Respondents have power to enact ordinances, levy
taxes, and take other actions which directly affect the
citizens.

Surely the Repondents expect the citizens to comply

with and honor the actions taken by city officials.

Why then

should Respondents not be expected to comply with all laws and
judicial directives to which they are subject?

The Respondents

should be the most stalwart example of honoring, obeying, and
upholding the laws of the State of Utah and the directives of
the District Court.

In this case, Respondents not only violated

the laws of the State of Utah, but they have defied and violated
a Temporary Restraining Order issued by the District Court.
The Supreme Court has before it the stipulated facts of the
parties.

These facts are sufficient for the Court to rule in

favor of Ward.

This is the third time these issues have come

before this Court, and Ward respectfully prays that this Court
grant him the relief that he has sought diligently for such a
long period of time.
Ward prays that this Court will award him the following
relief:
1.

Declare the actions of Respondents terminating Ward as

marshal on April 2, 1981, to be in violation of the Utah Open
and Public Meetings Act and therefore void ab initio;
2.

Declare the actions of Respondents in attempting to

ratify the termination of Ward of June 8, 1981 , in the
unscheduled city council meeting to be in violation of the
Temporary Restraining Order and therefore void ab initio;
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3.

Reverse the Order of the District Court granting

Respondents' Motion for Summary Judgment and reverse the
decision of the Utah Court of Appeals affirming that Order;
4«

Reinstate Ward as chief of police and declare the

actions of Respondents on April 2, 1981, and June 8, 1981, to be
void ab initio;
5.

Award back pay, back employment benefits, and general

damages to Ward;
6*

Award exemplary and punitive damages to Ward as prayed

for in his complaint;
7.

Award attorney fees, costs, and all other relief to

Ward as the Supreme Court deems appropriate;
8.

In the alternative, if the Supreme Court determines

that Ward was legally fired, declare that Ward as a marshal in a
third class city is entitled to a hearing to appeal his
termination pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sections 10-3-1105 and
10-3-1106 (1953) and/or the Richfield City Police Department
Policies and Procedures Manual, with the following provisions:
a.

Reinstate Ward as marshal with back pay, back

benefit, and general damages until Respondents provide Ward an
appeal hearing;
b.

Award exemplary and punitive damages to Ward;

c.

Award attorney fees, costs, and other relief to

Ward as this Court deems appropriate;
9.

Direct the District Court to take all actions necessary

to carry out and enforce the decision of this Court.
Respectfully submitted this 27th day of December, 1989.
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DISTRICT COURT ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AUD FOR SEVIER COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

BOYD A, WARD,
Plaintiff,
-vs-

ORDER
C i v i l No. 8626

RICHFIELD CITY, a municipal
Corporation, et al.
Defendant.

The Plaintiff and Defendant's Motions for Summary Judgments
on stipulated facts came before the Court on July 30, 1986.
The Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is Denied.

The

The Defendant's

Objection to Bill of Costs is Denied, except for the amount of the
cash bond which has been returned by Court Order to Plaintiff.
The Court finds that in accordance with 10-6-32 UCA, the law in
effect at the time of this case* the term of the Chief of Police of a
Third Class City shall be until the municipal election next following
his appointment, unless sooner removed by the Mayor with the concurrence
of a majority of members of the City Council, or by the City Council witt
the concurrence of the mayor.
The Court finds that Richfield City called a public meeting;
that the agenda delivered to the news media

did not have on it any

Information concerning the termination of the Police Chief; that the
City Council went into executive session during the publLc meeting

-2-

and later reconvened to announce the Police Chief termination.
Section 52-4-3 UCA provides that meetings should be open to
the public.

Section 52-4-8 provides that any final action taken in vio-

lation of Section 52-4-3 and Section 52-4-6 is voidable by a Court of
competent jurisdiction.
The absence of an item of business on the Agenda does not preclude
its consideration.

The "sunshine law" 52-4-1 UCA etc., provides that

meetings are open to the public.
news media.

The agenda is to be delivered to the

The penalty for violation is voidable by a Court of competent

jurisdiction.

Tie act does not establish any right to be heard or to

participate in debate, or to be represented by witnesses or legal council.
The purpose of the act is informational in its objective and does not
provide a procedural process for persons affected by legislative acts
of the Council except as above stated.
The Court finds that it would not be in the public interest to
void the action taken by the Richfield City Council on April 2, 1981, and
as ratified by it in a June 8 f 1981 meeting.
The only issue the Plaintiff in this case could litigate is whether
or not the Mayor and Counsel voted to terminate him, and the affidavits
filed in this case conclusively stated they did and they thereby dispose
of that issue.
The Court finds that the dismissal was not malicious or in wanton
disregard of Plaintiff's rights.
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CIVIL NO. 8626
Ward -vs- Richfield City
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

Mailed a copy of the above and foregoing Order to
postage prepaid from offices at Manti, Utah, t h i a ^ X
1986:
Ken Chamberlain, Attorney at Law
76 South Main
Richfield, Utah, 84701
George E. Brown, Jr.
Attorney at Law
7001 South 900 East Suite 340
Midvale, Utah, 84047

Carole B. Mellor
Trial Court Execut
Manti, Utah, 84642

day

DISTRICT COURT ORDER PERTAINING TO
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

GEORGE E.

BROWN, J R . | A3GTfc2]

f£>J&-

Attorney for Plaintiff
7001 S o u t h 900 E a s t , S u i t e t S & l n r I
M i d v a l e , UT 84047
Telephone:
(801) 562-55S5:V

"
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN A N D ^ R SEVIER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
BOYD A. WARD,
Plaintiff,

ORDER

vs.
RICHFIELD CITY,
a municipal corporation, et al

Civil No. 8626

Defendant.
The Plaintiff and his attorney, George E. Brown, Jr., and
the attorney for defendants, Ken Chamberlain, appeared before
the Honorable Don V. Tibbs on the 30th day of July, 1986.

The

Court, having reviewed the plaintiffs Motion for Change of
Venue, the plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction, and
the plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint, arguments having been
made,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the plaintiff 's Motion for Change
of Venue is denied.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED chat the plaintiff's .Motion to Amend
the Complaint is granted subject to the defendant *s right to
provide further opposing argument in the event that the
defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied.

since the

defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment addresses the new cause
of action contained in the plaintiff's Amended Complaint, the

granting of the defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment will
result in judgment against the plaintiff on all causes of action
contained in the plaintiff's Amended Complaint.
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that the plaintiff's Motion for
Preliminary Injunction is denied, and it is specifically ordered
that the Temporary Restraining Order terminated on June 17,
1981, the date of the first hearing before this Court.
DATED this ^ 2 - d a y of

O c ^ t l U M

, 1986.
COURT:

I hereby certify that I ma-iled a true and cornect copy of
the foregoing Order, postage prepaid, on this ^t^\day of
October, 1986, to the following individual:
Ken Chamberlain
OLSEN AND CHAMBERLAIN
Attorneys for Defendants
76 South Main Street
Richfield, UT 84701
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individually and in his official
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I through V,
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
00O00-——

Boyd A. Ward,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

OPINION
(For Publication)

v.
Case No. 880713-CA
Richfield City, a municipal
corporation, et al.,

FILED

Defendants and Respondents.

Sixth District, Sevier County
The Honorable Don V. Tibbs
Attorneys:

^ W r y T Nco.mn
Clark of *\%\ Court
Uteh Court 01 Appeals

George E. Brown, Jr., Midvale, for Appellant
Ken Chamberlain, Richfield, for Respondents

Before Judges Davidson, Billings, and Garff.
DAVIDSON, Judge:
This appeal concerns whether appellant, Boyd Ward, was
properly dismissed as Richfield City Chief of Police. Ward
claimed below that the Utah Open and Public Meetings Act was
violated, that the Richfield City Council disregarded a
temporary restraining order by taking further subsequent
action to dismiss him as Chief of Police, and that his request
for an administrative appeal was improperly deni.ed. The trial
court granted summary judgment in favor of Richfield City. We
affirm.
FACTS
On April 2, 1981, the Richfield City Council held a public
meeting after publishing an agenda as required by Utah Code
Ann. § 52-4-6 (1981). The agenda did not list Ward's
discharge as Chief of Police. Following discussion of items
on the agenda, the Council voted to hold a closed meeting and

invited Ward to join them in discussing his position as Chief
of Police* The Council was concerned about several recent
resignations within the police department. Discussion of
Ward's termination ensued and the Council decided to terminate
Ward. The Council resumed open session and formally voted to
discharge Ward effective April 3, 1981.
On April 6, 1981, Ward submitted a written request to the
Council for an administrative appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§§ 10-3-1105 and -1106 (1981). The request was denied. On
June 5, 1981, the Council published notice that a special
meeting would be held on June 8, 1981# to ratify its actions
taken at the April meeting. The Council published an agenda
that included Ward's discharge as an item for discussion.
Prior to the meeting, Ward served the Council with a temporary
restraining order, to restrain it from taking any further
action against hinf. Despite the temporary restraining order,
the Council ratified its decision to terminate Ward.
On June 17, 1981, the trial court held a preliminary
injunction hearing and determined that pursuant to the removal
statute for chiefs of police, Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-911
(repealed 1987), it had no jurisdiction to hear the matter.
Section 10-3-911 stated in part that "[t]he chief of police or
fire department of the cities may at any time be removed,
without a trial, hearing or opportunity to be heard, by the
board of commissioners whenever in its opinion the good of the
service will be served thereby."
Ward appealed the trial court's decision to the Utah
Supreme Court and the court decided in Ward v. Richfield Citv,
716 P.2d 265 (Utah 1984), that the trial court did have
jurisdiction because section 10-3-911 did not pertain to third
class cities. The case was remanded to the trial court. On
remand, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of
Richfield City. The court ruled that although the agenda for
the April 2, 1981 meeting did not include the termination of
Ward as Chief of Police, nevertheless, it was not in the public
interest to void the Council's action at either the April 2 or
the June 8 meeting.
Ward contends on appeal that: (1) the Council violated the
Utah Open and Public. Meetings Act in the April 2, 1981 meeting;
(2) the Council, on June 8, 1981, acted in violation of the
temporary restraining order; (3) the Council wrongfully denied
him the right to appeal his discharge; (4) the trial court
erroneously applied the law in granting summary judgment in
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favor of Richfield City; and (5) he is entitled to
reinstatement, back pay and damages.
UTAH OPEN AND PUBLIC MEETINGS ACT
We first examine whether the Council violated the Utah Open
and Public Meetings Act, Utah Code Ann, §§ 52-4-1 to -9 (1981),
at the April 2, 1981 meeting and if so, whether the June 8
meeting cured any such violation. The purpose of the Utah Open
and Public Meetings Act is to ensure that the actions of the
state, its agencies, and political subdivisions are conducted
openly,fififiCommon Cause of Utah v. Utah Public Serv. Comm'n.
598 P.2d 1312 (Utah 1979), Political subdivisions, as defined
in Utah Code Ann, § 10-1-201 (1981), include municipal
corporations and municipalities. Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-601
(1981) provides that all meetings of the governing body of each
municipality shall be held in compliance with the provisions of
the open and public meetings law.
Ward contends that Richfield City failed to comply with the
agenda and notice provisions of the open meetings law and that
such failure should void the action taken at the April
meeting. Ward argues that the subject of his discharge should
have been listed on the agenda, even if discussions regarding
him were conducted in a closed meeting. This contention fails
for two reasons. First, the open meetings act designates
certain subjects which are exempt from discussion in open
meetings. See section 52-4-5. Where at least two-thirds of
the public body present at an open meeting vote to hold a
closed meeting to discuss the character, professional
competence, or physical or mental health of an individual, then
a closed meeting may be held. See section 52-4-4. The Council
voted in the April open meeting to sequester themselves to
discuss Ward's professional competence in compliance with
section 52-4-4. The Council concluded the closed meeting with
a unanimous vote, one member abstaining, to discharge Ward.
Minutes of the closed meeting were recorded and when the
Council resumed open session, a formal vote to discharge Ward
was taken.1
1. Prior to the closed session, the Council asked whether
anyone present wanted to be notified if open session resumed.
Most of those present were members of the media and they
responded that they did not necessarily desire to return, but
wanted to be advised if action were taken.
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Second, even if technical violations had occurred in the
April meeting, they were subsequently cured. On June 5, notice
of the special session scheduled for June 8 was provided to the
local newspaper and the radio station in compliance with the
agenda and notice provisions of section 52-4-6(3). The agenda
for the June 8 meeting included Ward's discharge and the media
was notified more than twenty-four hours in advance. At the
June meeting, the Council voted without opposition to ratify
its actions taken at the April meeting. Ward argues that the
action taken at the June meeting violated the temporary
restraining order.2 The order restrained the Council from
taking any further action against him. Richfield City argues
that the June meeting merely ratified action that had already
been taken and, therefore, was not new action.
In a oroceedina for violation of an iniunction. it is
generally neia tnat tne extent or tne pumsnment rests in tne
sound discretion of the court. See Hensley v. Board of
Education. 210 Kan. 858, 504 P.2d 184, 189 (1972); People v.
Mulorew, 19 111. App. 3d 327, 311 N.E.2d 378, 383 (1974). -The
inherent power of a court rendering a permanent injunction to
enforce its decree and to modify or revoke the injunction for
equitable reasons due to changed conditions is generally
recognized . . . ." Mulcrrew, 311 N.E.2d at 382. The trial
court held that it was not in the public's best interest to
void the action taken by the Council in terminating Ward. We
will not disturb judgments in injunction proceedings that rest
within the sound discretion of the trier of facts, unless an
abuse of discretion clearly appears from the record. See
Hensley, 504 P.2d at 188.
RIGHT TO APPEAL DISCHARGE
The Mayor, with the advice and consent of the Council,
appointed Ward to the position of Richfield City Chief of
Police, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-916 (1981). This
same body had the authority to dismiss Ward, without a hearing,
notice, or cause. In Hutchison v. Cartwriqht, 692 P.2d 772,
773-774 (Utah 1984), the court held that unless otherwise
controlled by statute, the power to suspend or dismiss is
2. Ward asserts that he would have mobilized supporters had he
known the Council planned on taking action despite the
temporary restraining order. However, the council was under no
duty to notify Ward personally of its intended action.

880713-CA

4

appurtenant to the power to appoint. -When an individual is
appointed by an official, 'the office is held during the
pleasure of the authority making the appointment, and . . . no
notice or charges or hearings are required for the suspension
or removal by the authority appointing the officer.•" I£. at
774 (quoting Sheriff of Salt Lake County v. Board of Comm'rs,
71 Utah 593, 268 P. 783, 784 (1928)). "The rule of common law
was that the appointment to municipal office carried with it no
vested property interest in continued employment, and such
officers were subject to removal without cause, reason or
hearing unless otherwise prescribed." Carlson v. Bratton, 681
P.2d 1333, 1337 (Wyo. 1984). Since the Utah Supreme Court
determined that section 10-3-911 did not apply, there is not an
applicable statute explicitly governing the dismissal of chiefs
of police or city marshals in third class cities.3
Therefore, based on common law, we conclude that the Mayor and
the Council had independent authority to discharge Ward,
without a hearing, notice or cause.
Ward, nevertheless, contends that he has a right to appeal
his discharge under sections 10-3-1105 and -1106. Section
10-3-1105 provides that "[a]11 appointive officers and
employees of municipalities, other than members of the police
departments, fire departments, heads of departments, and
superintendents, shall hold their employment without limitation
of time, being subject to discharge or dismissal only ££L
hereinafter provided." (Emphasis added.) Ward argues that he
does not fall within the exception because he is not a member
of a "police department" per se, but a city marshal with
appointed assistants. However, we read sections 10-3-1105 and
-1106 as specifically excluding him. Other sections in chapter
10 use the term "chief of police" interchangeably with "city
marshal." See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-918 (1986). As

3. Ward contends that the trial court erroneously applied Utah
Code Ann. § 10-6-32 which was repealed in 1977. This section
provided for the term of employment and removal of appointed
officers, without cause, in first, second and third class
cities. This section was not replaced with a statute expressly
directing the removal of chiefs of police in third class
cities. However, in light of our analysis that Ward does not
have a right to appeal and that he can be removed without
cause, we find that the trial court, nevertheless, reached the
correct result. Therefore, the trial court's application of
section 10-6-32 was harmless error.
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Chief of Police, we hold that Ward is both a member of a
"police department- and the head of that "department."
Ward also argues that even if he falls within the
exception to section 10-3-1105 because he is a chief of
police, nevertheless, the language in the second sentence of
section 10-3-1106 applies to "any officer." Because these
sections must be read together and should harmonize with the
purpose of the whole act, Jensen v. Intermountain Health Care.
IHSL»., 679 P.2d 903, 906 (Utah 1984), we hold that the language
"as hereinafter provided" in section 10-3-1105 specifically
modifies the sections that follow. "Separate parts of [an]
act should not be construed in isolation from the rest of the
act.- Id. Saa ALaa Stahl v. Utah Transit Auth.. 618 P.2d
480, 481 (Utah 1980). Therefore, "any officer" as appears in
section 10-3-1106 must mean any officer not excluded in
section 10-3-1105.
Our holding is in keeping with the rationale behind the
power to discharge a chief of police without a hearing,
notice, or cause. Since the chief of police is appointed to
carry out the policies of the mayor "[t]he position of chief
of police is clearly recognized as different than that of any
other position in the police department for the obvious reason
that the chief of police is in a position of making and
carrying out policy for the mayor." Carlson, 681 P.2d at
1335. The result is there is no protected property interest
in the position of chief of police. I&. at 1337.4

4. Ward contends that he has a right to appeal under the
"Richfield City Police Department Policies and Procedures
Manual." The pertinent sections of the manual provide that a
member of the department may request a review of disciplinary
action by submitting a written request to the chief of police
and that dismissals are subject to appeal to the Richfield
City Appeals Board. However, these sections specifically
pertain to officers under the supervision of the chief of
police and not to the chief himself.
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The sununary judgment is affirmed.

Richard C. Davidson, Judge

WE CONCUR:
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10-3-917.

the second class shall be an office of record for all
state any cause for removal. From the time of notification the person removed shall not in any case be
maps, plans, plats, profiles, drawings, final estimentitled to any salary or compensation.
irn
ates, specifications and contracts which in any way
relate to the public improvements and engineering
10-3-912. Department heads may suspend
affairs of the city. The city engineer shall be custosubordinates.
dian of all drawings and documents above mentiThe chief of each department may at any time
oned,
im
suspend any subordinate officers, member, empl10-3-904c Books and supplies - Recording, filing
oyee or agent employed therein when in his judggnd Inspection.
ment the good of the service demands it, for a
The city engineer's office shall be supplied with
period of time not exceeding 15 days,, and during
the time of suspension the person suspended shall
aII necessary books, cases and supplies for recording
not be entitled to any salary or compensation whaand filing as required. The city engineer shall record
tsoever.
\rn
and file all drawings and documents pertaining to
10*3-913. Powers and duties of chief of police.
public lands and improvements. Those made in his
office shall be placed on record as soon as complThe chief of police shall, in the discharge of his
eted and shall then be open for public inspections,
duties, have the same powers, responsibilities as
and any person copying the same or taking notes
sheriffs and constables; he shall suppress riots, disturbances and breaches of the peace, and apprehend
therefrom may do so in pencil only. He shall keep
all persons committing any offense against the laws
the records and files in good condition and turn the
of the state or the ordinances of the city. He shall at
same o^cr to his successor in office. He shall allow
all times diligently and faithfully discharge his duties
no alteration, mutilation or changes to be made in
and enforce all ordinances and regulations of the
any matter of record, and shall be held strictly accountable for the same.
\m city for the preservation of peace, good order and
the protection of the rights and property of all
10-3-905° Fees to be paid in advance.
persons.
\m
The city engineer shall not record any drawings or
instruments, or file any papers or notices, or furnish
10-3-914. Police officers - Powers and duties.
any copies, or render any service connected with his
The police officers of any municipality shall have
office, until the fees for the same are paid or tendthe same powers and responsibilities as constables.
ered as prescribed by law or ordinance.
\m
It shall be the duty of the police force in any mun10-3-906. Seal.
icipality at all times to preserve the public peace,
The city engineer shall be provided with a seal by
prevent crime, detect and arrest offenders, suppress
riots, protect persons and property, remove nuisa(he city for his use, containing the words #
nces existing in the public streets, roads and highCity, Utah, Engineering Department*. The seal shall
be affixed to every certification approval.
tm ways, enforce every law relating to the suppression
of offenses, and perform all duties required of them
10-3-907. Recordation not to interfere with other
by ordinance or resolution.
\m
recordation.
10-3-915c Rights to arrest without warrant.
The recording or filing of any drawing or instruThejnembers of the police force shall have the
ment in the city engineer's office shall not interfere
power and authority, without process, to arrest and
or conflict in any way with the recording or filing of
take into custody any person who shall commit or
the same in other offices of record.
\m
threaten or attempt to commit in the presence of the
10-3-906. Noncompliance a misdemeanor.
officer, or within his view, any breach of the peace,
Any city engineer who fails to comply with sector any offense directly prohibited by the laws of this
ions 10-3-903 through 10-3-907 is guilty of a
state or by ordinance.
\m
misdemeanor.
ICT
10-3-916. Recorder, treasurer, marshal in cities of
10-3-909. Police and fire departments in cities of
third class and towns.
(he first and second class.
In each city of the third class and town on or
The board of city commissioners or other goverbefore the first Monday in February following a
ning body of each city of the first or the second
municipal election the mayor, with the advice and
class shall create, support, maintain and control a
consent of the city council, shall appoint a qualified
police department and may create, support, mainperson to each of the offices of city recorder, treatain and control a fire department in their respective
surer, and marshal. The city recorder shall be ex
cities.
ifTf
officio the city auditor and shall perfoirm the duties
10-3-910. Heads of departments and subordinate
of such office. The mayor, with the advice and
officers.
consent of the council, may also appoint and fill
The administration of the police and fire departvacancies in all such officers and agents as may be
ments shall consist of a chief of the department and
provided for by law or ordinance, except as is othsuch officers, members, employees and agents as the
erwise provided by law. All officers shall continue in
board of commissioners may by ordinance prescribe,
».*nd Lhe-board of commissioners shall-appoint^ the I office until their successors are. appointed and qualified,
iw
heads of such departments.
im
10-3-917. Engineer in cities of the third class and
10-3-911. Removal of departmental heads.
towns.
The chief of the police or fire department of the
c,
The governing body of cities of the third class and
i«es may at any time be removed, without a trial,
towns may by ordinance establish the office of
"caring or opportunity to be heard, by the board of
municipal engineer and prescribe the duties and
commissioners whenever in its opinion the good of
ln
« service will be served thereby. Its action in j obligations for that office which are consistent with
'^moving the chief of either department shall be | the duties and obligations of the city engineer in
"nal and conclusive and shall not be received or j cities of the first and second class. Where a city of
ca
*led in question before any court. The city rcco- I the third class or town uses the engineer employed
r cr
by the county in which the municipality is located,
£ shall forthwith notify in writing the removed
c
the municipality may, by ordinance prescribe for its
«ief of his removal, and it shall not be necessary to
"*» Utah
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10-3-918.

Cities and

municipal engineer either the duties of a municipal
engineer or, if different, the duties of the county
engineer, or a combination of duties.
irn
10-3-9IS. Chief of police or marshal in third class
cities and towns.
In cities of the third class and towns, the chief of
police or marshal shall exercise and perform such
duties as may be prescribed by the governing body.
The chief of police or marshal shall be under the
direction, control and supervision of the mayor. The
chief of police or marshal may with the consent of
the mayor, appoint assistants to the chief of police
or marshal.
iw
10-3-919. Powers, duties and obligations of
police chief, marshal and their assistants in cities
of the third class and towns.
The chief of police, marshals and their assistants
in cities of the third class and towns shall have all of
the powers, rights and duties respectively conferred
on such officers in sections 10-3-913 through 103-915.
\m
10-3*920. Bail commissioner - Powers and
duties.
The mayor of any city of the third class, with the
advice and consent of the city council, and the
board of commissioners in other cities, may appoint
from among the officers and members of the police
department of the city one or more discreet persons
to be known as bail commissioners, who shall have
and exercise all the powers which are now or hereafter may be conferred by law upon justices of the
peace or judges of the circuit court in respect to the
fixing of bail of persons arrested within the corporate limits of the city for misdemeanors under the
laws of the state or for violation of the city ordinances, and to the takirig and the approving of the
same. Any person who has been ordered by any
such bail commissioner to give bail may deposit the
amount thereof in money with such bail commissioner.
1913
10-3-921. Fines - Collection by bail
commissioner - Accounting.
In addition to their duties in respect to the fixing
of bail, bail commissioners shall have power on
nonjudicial days, and after the hour of 5 o'clock
p.m. and before the hour of 9 o'clock a.m. on
judicial days, to collect and receipt for moneys
tendered in payment of the fine of any person
serving sentence in default of the payment of such
fine. All moneys collected by bail commissioners
shall be accounted for at least once a month to the
clerk of the circuit court in cities where a municipal
department of the circuit court exists, and in cities
where such department does not exist such accounting shall be made to the city treasurer, or in cases
arising under the state laws to the county treasurer.
1*77

10-3-922. Term of bail commissioners • Salary
• Boud and oath.
Commissioners appointed under this article shall
serve at the pleasure of the governing body or
mayor appointing them, and shall receive no compensation as such. Before entering upon their dunes
as bail commissioners they shall take and subscribe
an oath to faithfully and impartially discharge the
duties of their office, and shall give bond to the city
wherein they are appointed, with two good and
sufficient individual sureties or with a single corporate surety, to be approved by the governing body
or mayor appointing them, which bond shall be in
the sum of $2,500, conditioned for the faithful
performance of their duties as such commissioners,
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and that they will well and truly account for and
turn over to the clerk of the circuit court or to the
treasurer of their respective cities or counties, as the
case may be. at such times as may be designated by
the governing body of the city, all moneys, bonds,
properly and records coming into their hands as
such commissioners, and that at the expiration of
their term of office they will surrender and turn
over as aforesaid all funds, bonds, properly, papers
and records then in their hands pertaining to their
respective offices. Suit upon any such bond may be
brought by any county, city or person injured.
\m
10-3-923. City and town justices of the peace Appointment - Vacancies • Disqualification Compensation • Payment of fees, fines,
forfeitures or other sums to treasurer.
(1) Each municipality which does not have a
municipal department of the circuit court may, IQ
the manner it appoints other officers, appoint a
justice of the peace. Justices of the peace shall be
appointed to terms of four years beginning the first
Monday in February, 1980, provided that justices
now holding office or appointed to fill any vacancy
shall hold office until the successor is duly appointed and qualified. Municipal justice* of the peace
may be removed from office in the same manner as
county justices.
(2) If a vacancy shall occur in the office of a
municipal justice, the mayor or town president, by
and with the consent of the governing body, shall
forthwith fill such vacancy by appointment for the
unexpired term The person appointed shall qualify
in the same manner as a municipal justice, and shall
have and exercise all the powers conferred by law
upon such municipal justice In case any municipal
justice shall for any reason be unable or disqualified
to perform the duties of his office, or shall be
absent, the mayor or town president shall appoint
some other justice of the peace residing within the
county to act as the municipal justice of the peace
pro tempore, and he shall have and discharge the
duties of [sic] such municipal justice might have, but
during the existence of such disability or absence
only
(3) The salary of the municipal justices of the
peace shall be set by ordinance in the manner prescribed by section 78-5-29
(4) All fees, fines, forfeitures or any other sums
collected by the justice of the peace shall be paid to
the municipal treasurer within seven days of receipt.
(5) Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of a
municipal justice of the peace, the municipality may
contract with the county or another municipality to
share the services of a justice. The contract shall be
for the same term as the term of the justice whose
services are sought Municipalities may contract for
the services of a county or municipal justice during
their entire term at any time there is a vacancy in
the office of municipal justice. Vacancies may be
created by refusing to reappoint a person to the
office of justice of the peace.
\m
10-3-924. Appointment of manager.
The governing body of any city or town may by
ordinance establish a manager form of government
and appoint any person to be known as the
manager
\m
10-3-925. Term of office.
The manager shall serve at the pleasure of the
governing body except that the governing body may
employ the manager for a term not to exceed three
years. The term of employment may be renewed at
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any time. Any person serving as manager of a
municipality under (his section may be removed with
or without cause by a majority vote of the governing body.
1977
10-3-926. Duties of the manager.
The governing body shall, by ordinance or resolution, prescribe the powers, duties and obligations
of the manager.
1*77
10°3-927. Legislative powers and official position
of the mayor not delegated.
The legislative and judicial powers of the mayor,
his position as chairman of the governing body and
any ex officio position the mayor shall hold shall
not be delegated to the manager.
i*77
10-3-92*. Attorney.
The city attorney shall have the duty to prosecute
violations o f city ordinances and shall have the same
powers in respect to violations o f city ordinances as
may be exercised by a county attorney in respect to
violations o f state law, including, but not limited to,
granting immunity to witnesses for violations of city
ordinances.
i»77

10-3-1007.

made except according to law and under the rules
and regulations of the civil service commission. The
head of each of the departments may, and the
deputy chiefs of the police and fire departments and
assistant chiefs o f the police department shall, be
appointed from the classified civil service, and upon
the expiration o f his term or upon the appointment
of a successor shall be returned ihercto.
im
10-3-1003. Commission - Ntiml^er, term,
vacancies.
In each city of the first and second class there
shall be a civil service commission, consisting of
three members appointed by the board of commissioners. Their term of office shall be six years, but
they shall be appointed so that the term of office of
one member shall expire on <he 30th day of June of
each even-numbered year. If a vacancy occurs in
the civil service commission, it shall be filled by
appointment by the board of city commissioners for
the unexpired term.
\m
10-3-1004. Qualifications of commissioners
Salary - Removal.

Not more than two members of the civil service
commission shall at any one lime be of the same
political party. No member of the civil service
10-3-1001. Subordlnants in police, health, and fire
commission shall during his tenure of office hold
departments to be appointed from list.
any other public office, or be a candidate for any
10-3-1002. Classified civil service - Employment
other public office. Each member shall receive $25
constituting.
10-3-1003. Commission - Number, term, vacancies.
for each meeting of the commission which he shall
10-3-1004. Qualifications of commissioners - Salary attend, but shall not receive more than SI00 in any
Removal.
one month. In case of misconduct, inability or
10-3-1005. Organization of commission - Secretary willful neglect in the performance of the duties of
Offices,
the office by any member, the member may be
10-3-1006. Rules and regulations . Printing and
removed from office by the board of city commissdistribution.
ioners by a majority vote of the entire membership,
10-3-1007. Examinations.
but the member shall, if he so desires, have the
10-3-1008. Appointments from civil service list opportunity to be heard in defense.
\m
Probation period.
10-3-1009. Certification of applicants for position •
10-3-1005. Organization of commission Number - Eligible lists* removal.
Secretary - Offices.
10-3-1010. Promotions • Rasas - Certification of
The civil service commissnon shall organize by
applicants.
selecting one of its members chairman, and shall
10-3-1011. Temporary employees.
appoint as secretary one of the available officers or
10-3-1012. Discharge by department head - Appeal to
employees of the city, who shall act and serve
commission - Hearing and decision.
10-3-1013. Annual and special reports by commission.
without additional compensation. The secretary shall
keep a record of all meetings of the civil service
commission and of its work and shall perform such
10-3-100L Subordinates in police, health, and
other services as the commission may require, and
fire departments to be appointed from list.
The head o f each of the police and fire departm- shall have the custody of the books and records of
ents o f cities o f the first and second class and the the commission. The board of city commissioners
health officer in cities o f the first class shall, by and shall provide suitable accomodations and equipment
with the advice and consent o f the board o f city to enable the civil service commission to attend to
\m
commissioners, and subject to the rules and regula- its business.
10-3-1006. Rules and regulations - Printing and
tions o f the civil service commission, appoint from
the classified civil service list furnished by the civil
distribution.
service commission all subordinate officers, emploThe civil service commission shall make all neceyees, members or agents in his department, and in ssary rules and regulations to carry out the purposes
like manner fill all vacancies in the same.
i»77 of this part and for examinations, appointments and
promotions. All rules and regulations shall be
10-3-1002. Classified civil service - Employment
printed by the civil service commission for distribconstituting.
I»77
The classified civil service shall consist of all ution.
10-3-1007. Examinations.
places o f employment now existing or hereafter
All applicants for employment in the classified
created in or under the police department and the
fire department o f each city o f the first and second civil service shall be subject to examination, which
class, and the health department in cities of the first shall be public, competitive and free. Examinations
class, except the head of the departments, deputy shall be held at such times and places as the civil
chiefs o f the police and fire departments and assis- service commission shall from time to time detertant chiefs o f the police department in cities o f the mine, and shall be for the purpose of determining
first and second class, and the members of the the qualifications o f applicants for positions. Exaboard o f health o f the departments. N o appointm- minations shall be practical and shall fairly test the
ents to any o f the places of employment constituting fitness in every respect of the persons examined to
the classified civil service in the departments shall be discharge the duties o f the positions to which they
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seek to be appointed, and shall include tests of
physical qualifications and health.
\m
10-3-1008. Appointments from civil service list Probation period.
In all cases the appointing power shall notify the
civil service commission of each separate position to
be filled, and shall fill such place by the appointment of one of the persons certified by the commission therefor. Such appointment shall be on probation, and of a character and for a period to be
prescribed by the civil service commission.
\m
10-3-1009. Certification of applicants for position
• Number • Eligible lists, removal.
Whenever a position in the classified civil service
is to be filled, the civil service commission shall as
soon as possible certify to the appointing power the
names of Vive persons to fill such position from
those persons having the highest standing in the
eligible list but a lesser number may be certified
when there is not the required number on the eligible list. If more than one position is available in the
same department, the civil service commission shall
also certify to the appointing power one additional
name for each additional position to be filled. All
persons not appointed shall be restored to their relative positions on the eligible list. All persons who
have been on the eligible list for two years without
appointment shall be removed therefrom and can
only be returned thereto upon regular examination.
1913

10-3-1010. Promotions - Basis - Certification
of applicants.
The civil service commission shall provide for
promotion in the classified civil service on the basis
of ascertained merit, seniority in service and standing obtained by competitive examination, and shall
provide, in all cases where practicable, that vacancies shall be filled by promotion from the members
of the next tower rank as submit themselves for the
examination aod promotion. The civil service commission shall certify to the appointing power the
names of not more than five applicants having the
highest rating for each promotion.
IWJ
10-3-1011. Temporary employees.
The head of each department, with the advice and
consent of the board of city commissioners, may
employ any person for temporary work only,
without making the appointment from the certified
list, but the appointment shall not be longer than
one month in the same calendar year, and under no
circumstances shall the temporary employee be
appointed to a permanent position unless he shall
have been duly certified by the civil service commission as in other cases.
\m
10-3-1012. Discharge by department head Appeal to commission • Hearing and decision.
All persons in the classified civil service may be
removed from office or employment by the head of
the department for misconduct, incompetency or
failure to perform his duties or failure to observe
properly the rules of the department, but subject to
appeal by the discharged person to the civil service
commission. Any person discharged may, within
five days from the issuing by the head of the department of the order discharging him, appeal therefrom to the civil service commission, which shall
fully hear and determine the matter. The discharged
person shall be entitled to appear in person and to
have counsel and a public hearing. The finding and
decision of the civil service commission upon the
hearing shall be certified to the head of the department from whose order the appeal is taken, and
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shall be final, and shall forthwith be enforced and
followed by him.
tfrr
10-3-1013. Annual and special reports b>
commission.
The civil service commission shall in December of
each year make an annual report to the board of
city commissioners and shall make as many special
reports as the board of city commissioners shall
request.
i*n
Part 11. Personnel Rules and Benefits
10-3-110! through 10-3-U02. Repelled.
10-3-1103. Sickness, disability and detlh benefits.
10-3-1104. Library personnel • Monthly wage
deductions and matching sums - Time of inclusion.
10-3-1105. Appointive officer* and employees •
Duration and termination of term of office.
10-3-1106. Discharge or transfer • Appeals • Board •
Procedure.
10-3-1107. Cost of living adjustment • Price index used.

10-3-1101 through 10-3-1102. Repealed.
t*J
10-3-1103. Sickness, disability and death benefits.
(1) The governing body of each municipality may
maintain as to ail elective or appointive officers and
employees, including heads of departments, a system
for the payment of health, dental, hospital, medical,
disability and death benefits to be financed and
administered in a manner and payable upon the
terms and conditions as the governing body of the
municipality may by ordinance or resolution prescribe
(2) The governing bodies of the municipalities
may create and administer personnel benefit programs separately or jointly with other municipalities
or other political subdivisions of the State of Utah
or associations thereof.
im
10-3-1104. Library personnel • Monthly wage
deductions and matching sums - Time of
inclusion.
(1) The librarians, assistants and employees of any
public library may, at the discretion of (he board o(
directors of the library, be included within and
participate in the pension, retirement, sickness, disability and death benefit svstem established under
section 10-3-1103. In the event the librarian,
assistants and employees of the municipality are
included within and participate in the system, there
shall be deducted from the monthly wage or salary
of the librarian, assistants and employees and paid
into the system, a percentage of their wage or salary
equal to the percentage of the monthly wage or
salary of other employees of the municipality which
is paid into the system. Also there shall be paid
monthly into the system from the funds of the
library a further sum equal (o the total amount
deducted monthly from the wage or salary of the
librarian, assistants and employees and paid into the
retirement system.
(2) Where the election by the board of directors
of any library for inclusion of its librarian, assistants and employees within the system of any municipality is subsequent to the establishment of the
system, the inclusion ma.y begin as of the date of the
establishment of the svstem or as of the date of the
election as shall be determined b> the board of directors. If inclusion is as of the date o\ the establishment of the system, there shall be paid into the
system in addition to the subsequent monthly wage
deductions and matching sums, a sum equal to the
aggregate o( monthly pas roll deductions and matching sums that would have accrued during the
period beginning with the establishment of the
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swcm and ending with the election had the librarian, assistants and employees been included within
IITT
fhe system from its establishment
10-3-1105. Appointive officers and employees Duration and termination of term of office.
Ail appointive officers and employees of municipalities, other than members of the police departments, fire departments, heads of departments, and
superintendents, shall hold their employment
viiihout limitation of time, being subject to discharge or dismissal only as hereinafter provided
irn
10-3-1106. Discharge or transfer - Appeals Board - Procedure.

(1) No officer or employee covered by section 10M105 shall be discharged or transferred to a
position with less remuneration because of his politics or religious belief, or incident to, or through
changes, either in the elective officers, governing
bodv. or heads of departments. In all cases where
am officer or employee is discharged or transferred
from one position to another for any reason, he
shall have the right to appeal the discharge or transfer to a board to be known as the appeal board
which shall consist of five members, three of whom
shall be chosen by and from the appointive officers
and employees, and two of whom shall be members
of the governing body
(2) The appeal shall be taken by filing written
notice of the appeal with the recorder within ten
da\s after the discharge or transfer Upon the filing
of the appeal, the city recorder shall forthwith refer
a copy of the same to the appeal board Upon
receipt of the referral from the municipal recorder,
(he appeal board shall forthwith commence its investigation, take and receive evidence and fully hear
and determine the matter which relates to the cause
for the discharge or transfer
(3) The employee shall be entitled to appear in
person and to be represented by counsel, to have a
public hearing, to confront the witness whose testimony is lo be considered, and to examine the evidence to be considered by the appeal board.
(4) (n the event the appeal board upholds the
discharge or transfer, the officer or employee may
have 14 days thereafter to appeal to the governing
bodv whose decision shall be final In the event the
appeal board does not uphold the discharge or transfer the case shall be closed and no further proceedings shall be had.
(5) The decision of the appeal board shall be by
secret ballot, and shall be certified to the recorder
*uh 15 days from the date the matter is referred to
' The board may, in its decision, provide that an
•niployee shall receive his salary for the period of
>me during which he is discharged, or any defici*ncv m salary for the period he was transferred to a
position of less remuneration but not to exceed a 15
ta\ period. In no case shall the appointive officer or
'mployee be discharged or transferred, where an
ippcal is taken, except upon a concurrence of at
east a majority of the membership of the governing
J
ody of the municipality
(6) In the event that the appeal board does not
J
Phold the discharge, or transfer, the recorder shall
c
mf> the decision to the employee affected, and
l
'<o to the head of the department from whose
)r
Uer the appeal was taken The employee shall be
>a
»d his salary, commencing with the next working
,a
N following the certification by the recorder of the
l
PPeal board's decision, provided that the empl
,v
cc or officer, concerned reports for his assigned
'utics during that next working day

10-3-1201.

(7) The method and manner of choosing the
members of the appeal board, and the designation
of their terms of office shall be prescribed by the
go\erning body of each municipality by ordinance,
but the provisions for choosing the three members
from the appointed officers and employees shall m
no way restrict a free selection of members by the
appointive officers and employees of the municipality

I«TT

10-3-U07. Cost of living adjustment - Price
index used.
(1) The governing body of each municipality may.
in their discretion, adopt a plan to allow any person
who qualifies under this part to receive a cost of
living adjustment in their monthly retirement allowance; but the adjustment allowed shall be a percentage, not to exceed one hundred per cent, of the
sum as would restore the full purchasing power of
each person's original unmodified pension allowance as it was in the calendar year in which the
retirement giving rise to the pension occurred
(2) The amount necessary to restore trie full purchasing power of the original unmodified pension
allowance shall be computed from the consumers
price index published by the United States Bureau of
Labor Statistics
(3) Adjustments may be effective as of the date of
this act or at any subsequent date set by the govcr
nmg body A municipality may choose to pay any
per cent to the maximum amount provided that such
percentage be paid to all qualified persons equally
\m

Part 12. Alternative Forms of Municipal
Government
10-3-1201 Citation of act.
10-3-1202. Legislative finding
10-3-120J. Election requirements and procedure for
organization under optional form of government.
10-3-1204. Application of act
10-3-1205. Rights, powers, and duties of municipality
operating under optional form.
10-3-1206 Limitation on changing form of government.
10*3-1207 Disapproval of optional form by voters Limitation on resubmission.
10-3-1209. Election of officers - When new government
operative • Compensation of officials without position
in new government
10-3-1209 Council-mayor and council-manager form
defined
10-3-1210 Functions of the council
10-3-1211 Council members • Qualifications - Terms
of office.
10-3-1212. Meetings of council • Access to records.
10-3-1213. Chairmen of councils • Power to (all
witnesses and administer oath • Quorum - Voting
procedure
10-3-1214. Ordinance adoption under council-mayor
form - Powers of mayor
10-3-1215 Rules and regulations for government of
council.
10-3-1216. Council members elected from districts Boundary - Adjustments.
t0-3-1217 Limitations on actions and authority of
council members • Investigatory committees
10-3-1218 Vacancy in council
10-3-1219 Council-mayor form • Powers and duties
of mayor
IO-3-I2I9 5 Council-mayor form Ordinance* on
transfer of municipal properly and regulation of
subdivisions or annexations
10-3-1220 Council-mayor form • Appointment of
chief administrative officer
10-3-1221 Municipal administrative code in
council-mayor form
10-3-1222. Council-mayor form V acano in office of
mayor
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52-2-1.

Public Officers

justify when so required or to furnish additional
sureties when required, as herein provided, (he
board or officer charged with (he duty of approving
the bond of such officer shall declare such office
vacant within sixty days after notice personally
served upon (he officer, and at (he expiration of
said sixty-day period such office shall become
vacant unless such sureties justify or additional
qualified sureties be furnished within said period.
I9SJ

Chapter 2. Failure to Qualify for Office
52-2-1. Time in which to qualify - Failure •
Office declared vacant.
Whenever any person duly elected or appointed to
any office of the state or any of its political subdivisions, fails to qualify for such office within sixty
days after (he date of beginning of the (erm of
office for which he was elected or appointed, such
office shall thereupon become vacant and shall be
filled as provided by law. Whenever the bond of any
officer of the state or of any of its political subdivisions is canceled, revoked, annulled or otherwise
becomes void or of no effect, without another
proper bond being given so that continuance of
bonded protection is afforded, the office of such
officer shall (hereupon become vacant and shall be
filled as provided by law. Any elec(ed or appointed
official who has failed on the effecdve da(e of this
act to qualify for (he position to which he was
elected or appointed, shall be deemed to come
within (he provisions of (his act, and the office of
such officer shall become vacant at the end of forty
days after (he effective date of this act unless legal
bond is given before the expiration of such period,
and such office shall be filled as provided by law.
mj

Chapter 3. Prohibiting Employment of
Relatives

UTAH CUm.

»»*.i&
state of Utah or a political subdivision thereof prio£
(0 the time during which said related person
assumed said public position therein.
(b) Where (he employee or appointee was appojj
nted or employed subsequent to (he time durinf
which said related person assumed said public pop
ition but prior to (he effective date of this act tot
his appointment was not in contravention of (he
provisions of (his chapter in effect at the time.of
appointment.
(c) Where the employee or appointee was or «
eligible or qualified to be employed by a department
or agency of the state of Utah or a political subdi.
vision thereof as the result of his compliance with
civil service laws or regulations and merit system
laws or regulations or as the result of a certification
as to his qualification and fitness by a department
agency or subdivision of (he state authorized so>u>
do by law.
(d) Where the employee or appointee was oris
employed by the employing unit because he was or
is the only person available, qualified or eligible for
(he position.
tag
52-3-2. Each day of violation a separate offense.
Each day any such person, father, mother,
husband, wife, son, daughter, sister, brother, uncle,
aunt, nephew, niece, first cousins, moth-r-in-law,
father-in-law, brother-in-law, sister-in-law,
son-in-law or daughter-in-law, is retained in
office by any of said officials shall be regarded as i
separate offense.
its
52-3-3. Penalty.
Any person violating any of the provisions of this
chapter is guilty of a misdemeanor.
\m
52-3-4. Exception in (owns.
In towns, this chapter shall not apply to the
employment of uncles, aunts, nephews, nieces or
cousins.
WSJ

Chapter 4. Open and Public Meetings

S2-3-I. Employ meat or relatives prohibited
Exceptions.
52-3*2. Each day of violation a separate offense.
52-3-3. Penalty.
52-3-4. Exception in towns.

52-4*1. Declaration of public policy.
52-4.2. Definition*.
.52-4*3. Meetings open to Ike public • Exception*.
52-4-4. Closed meeting held upon vote of member*
Business - Reasons for meeting recorded.
52-4-5. Purposes of dosed meeting* - Chance meeting*
and social meeting* excluded • Disruption of meeting*.
52-3-1. Employment of relatives prohibited •
52-4-6. Public notice of meetings.
Exceptions.
Minute* of open meeting* • Public record*
It is unlawful for any person holding any position 52-4-7.
Recording of meeting*.
(he compensation for which is paid out of public 52-44. Suit lo avoid final action • Limitation
funds to employ, appoint, or vote for the appointException*.
ment uf; his ui lici fAtliefr'Timtlier/husMnd, wire,' %*4*f. enforcement orchapier • auu 10 compel
compliance.
son, daughter, sister, brother, uncle, aunt, nephew,
niece, first cousin, mother-in-law, father-inlaw, brother-in-law, sister-in-law, son-in- 52-4-1. Declaration of public policy.
law, or daughter-in-law in or to any position or
In enacting (his chapter, the legislature finds and
employment, when the salary, wages, pay or com- declares that the state, its agencies and politic*
pensation of such appointee is to be paid out of any subdivisions, exist to aid in the conduct of (h<
public funds. It is unlawful for such appointee to people's business. It is the intent of the law that
accept or to retain such employment when his initial (heir actions be taken openly and (hat (heir delibe•appointment thereto was made in contravention of rations be conducted openly.
itrt
the foregoing sentence by a person within (he 52-4-2. Definitions.
degrees of consanguinity or affinity (herein specified
As used in (his ace
having the direc( power of employment or appoint(1) "Meeting" means the convening of a public
ment (o such posuion, or by a board or group of body, with a quorum present, whether corporal or
which such person is a member.
by means of electronic equipment, for the purpose
The provisions of (his section shall not apply of discussing or acting upon a matter over which the
among others to the following employment situat- public body has jurisdiction or advisory power. This
ions:
chapter shall not apply to chance meetings.
(a) Where (he employee or appointee was appoi- "Convening/ as used in (his subsection, means the
nted or employed by a department or agency of (he calling of a meeting of a public body by a person or
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Public Officers

persons authorized to do so for the express purpose
jf discussing or acting upon a subject over which
that public body has jurisdiction.
(2) "Public body" means any administrative,
idit$ory% executive or legislative body of the state or
,t> political subdivisions which consists of two or
more persons that expends, disburses or is supported
.it whole or in part by tax revenue and which is
vc^cd with the authority to make decisions regarjmg the public's business. "Public body" does not
ncludc any political party, group or caucus or rules
or sifting committees of the legislature.
(3) "Quorum* means a simple majority of the
membership of a public body, unless otherwise
defined by applicable law, but a quorum does not
include a meeting of two elected officials by themselves when no aaion, either formal or informal, is
laken on a subject over which these elected officials
have jurisdiction.
mi
52-4-3. Meetings open to the public Exceptions.

Every meeting is open to the public unless closed
pursuant to sections 52-4-4 and 52-4-5.
\m
52-4-4. Closed meeting held upon vote of
members • Business - Reasons for meeting
recorded.
A closed meeting may be held upon the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the members of the
public body present at an open meeting for which
notice is given pursuant to section 52-4-6; provided, a quorum is present. No closed meeting is
allowed except as to matters exempted under section
52-4-5; provided, no ordinance, resolution, rule,
regulation, contract, or appointment shall be approved at a closed meeting. The reason or reasons for
holding a closed meeting and the vote, either for or
against the proposition to hold such a meeting, cast
by each member by name shall be entered on the
minutes of the meeting.
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to
require any meeting to be closed to the public.
\m
52-4-5. Purposes of closed meetings - Chance
meetings and social meetings excluded •
Disruption of meetings.
(1) A closed meeting may be held pursuant to
action 52-4-4 for any of the following purposes:
(a) Discussion of the character, professional
competence, or physical or mental health of an
individual;
(b) Strategy sessions with respect to collective
bargaining, litigation, or purchase of real property;
(c) Discussion regarding deployment of security
personnel or devices; and
(d) Investigative proceedings regarding allegations
of criminal misconduct.
(2) This chapter shall not apply to any chance
meeting or a social meeting. No chance meeting or
xfcial meeting shall be used to circumvent this
chapter.
(3) This chapter shall not prohibit the removal of
an
y person who willfully disrupts a meeting to the
cx
*ent that orderly conduct is seriously compromJ
*d.
If77
s
*-4-6. Public notice of meetings.
(I) Any public body which holds regular meetings
lhai
are scheduled in advance over the course of a
>car shall give public notice at least once each year
of
'is annual meeting schedule as provided in this
Scc
uon. The public notice shall specify the date.
l,m
e, and place of such meetings.
0.) In addition to the notice requirements of

&*• Co

52-4-9.

subsection (I) of this section, each public body shall
give not less than 24 hours' public notice of the
agenda, date, time and place of each of its meetings.
(3) Public notice shall be satisfied by:
(a) Posting written notice at the principal office
of the public body, or if no such office exists, at the
building where the meeting is to be held; and
(b) Providing notice to at least one newspaper
of general circulation within the geographic jurisdiction of the public body, or to a local media correspondent.
(4) When because of unforeseen circumstances it
is necessary for a public body to hold an emergency
meeting to consider matters of an emergency or
urgent nature, the notice requirements of section 524-6(2) may be disregarded and the best notice
practicable given. No such emergency meeting of a
public body shall be held unless an attempt has been
made to notify alt of its members and a majority
votes in the affirmative to hold the meeting.
t*?i
52-4-7. Minutes of open meetings - Public
records • Recording of meetings.
(1) Written minutes shall be kept of all open
meetings. Such minutes shall include:
(a) The date, time and place of the meeting;
(b) The names of members present and absent;
(c) The substance of ail matters proposed, discussed, or decided, and a record, by individual
member, of votes taken;
(d) The names of all citizens who appeared and
the substance in brief of their testimony;
(e) Any other information that any member requests be entered in the minutes.
(2) Written minutes shall be kept of all closed
meetings. Such minutes shall include:
(a) The date, time and place of the meeting;
(b) The names of members present and absent;
(c) The names of all others present except where
such disclosure would infringe on the confidence
necessary to fulfill the original purpose of closing
the meeting.
(3) The minutes are public records and shall be
available within a reasonable time after the meeting.
(4) All or any part of an open meeting may be
recorded by any person in attendance; provided, the
recording does not interfere with the conduct of the
meeting.
mi
52*4-8. Suit to avoid final action - Limitation
- Exceptions.
Any final action taken in violation of sections 524-3 and 52-4-6 is voidable by a court of competent jurisdiction. Suit to void final action shall be
commenced within 90 days after the action except
that with respect to any final aaion concerning the
issuance of bonds, notes, or other evidences of
indebtedness suit shall be commenced within 30 days
after the action.
i*7t
52-4-9. Enforcement of chapter • Suit to compel
compliance.
(1) The attorney general and county attorneys of
the state shall enforce this chapter.
(2) A person denied any right under this chapter
may commence suit in a court of competent jurisdiction to compel compliance with or enjoin violations of this chapter or to determine its applicability
to discussions or decisions of a public body. The
court may award reasonable attorney fees and court
costs to a successful plaintiff.
\m
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EXCERPT FROM: RICHFIELD CITY POLICY DEPARTMENT
POLICIES AND PROCEDURES MANUAL

POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

Policy No. 10

Date
January 1, 1979
Subject
fttpartmental
Discipline
Effective Date
January 1, 1979
This directive shall supersede all other departmental polircies*
dealing with departmental discipline*
Persons Subject to Disciplinary Action
A.

Any officer wfeo violates his trust by committing
any offense punishable under the laws, ordinances/ or
statutes of the United States, the State of Utah, the City
of Richfield; or who violates any provisions of the Rules
and Regulations of the Richfield City Police Department; or
who disobeys any lawful order; or who is incompetent to
perform his duties; is subject to appropriate disciplinary
action.

B.

The word "discipline11 is a derivative of the latin word
"disciplina", meaning instruction or education. The
purpose of discipline is to facilitate coordination of
effort. Positive discipline is an inner personal desire to
observe and follow the regulations and procedures of an
organization. Negative discipline is compliance through
fear of punishment or penalty. It is the hope that all
officers will exercise positive discipline.

C.

Penalties - Subject to the anproval of the Chief of Police,
the following penalties may be imposed against any
officer or employee of the Department as disciplinary

action:
1)

Verbal rer-^ , d n d '
Suspension.

4)

Demotion.

5)

Dismissal.

Departmental Authority to Discipline
D.

Pinal departmental disciplinary authority and responsibility
rests with the Chief of Police.

Except for verbal

reprimands and emergency suspensions, all departmental
discipline must be taken or approved by the Chief of
Police.
E.

Other supervisory personnel may take the following
disciplinary measures:
1)

Verbal reprimand.

2)

Written reprimand

(subject to approval by the commanding

officer).

F.

3)

Emergency suspensions.

4)

Written recommendations for other penalties.

Emergency Suspension - Any command or supervisory officer
has the authority to impose emergency suspension until the
next business day against an officer or employee when it is
apparant that such action is in the best interest of the
Department.

G.

Follow-Up Action on Emergency Suspension - An officer or
employee receiving an emergency suspension shall be
required to report to the Chief of Police on the next business
day at 1000 hours (10:00 a.m.) unless otherwise directed
by compet~enE~~authority.

The command or supervisory officer

imposing or recommending the suspension shall also report
to the Chief of Police at the same time.
Complaints Against Police Personnel
H.

All complaints arising externally (from outside the Police
Department) shall be brought to the attention of the Chief
immediately,

I.

Internal complaints shall be brought to the attention of
the Chief or other supervisory officer.

J.

All complaints against Police Personnel shall be reduced
to written form.

K.

A supervisory officer receiving an internal complaint shall
conduct an immediate investigation into the allegation.

If

the allegation is substantiated he shall then take action to
correct the infraction immediately.
Reports of Disciplinary Action Taken or Recommended
L.

Whenever disciplinary action is taken or recommended,
(except for oral reprimand) a written report must be
submitted immediately containing the following information:
1)

The name, rank, and present assignment of the person
being disciplined.

2)

The date(s) and time(s) of the misconduct and the
location(s)•

3)

The section number(s) of this manual violated and/or
the common name for the infraction.

4)

A complete statement of the facts of the misconduct,.

5)

The punishment imposed or recommended.

*)

The written signature and rank of the preparing
officer and his position in relation to the
member being disciplined.

M.

Distribution of Reports of Disciplinary Action The report shall be distributed as follows by the
officer imposing or recommending disciplinary action:
1)

Original and copy to the Chief via the complete
chain of cormand.

2)

CODV

to the person being charged.

1)

CODV

to the Citv Manaaer.

4)

Copy retained by officer imposing or recommending
the action.

H.

Endorsement and Forxvarding of Disciplinary Reports Each level in the chain of command must endorse and
forward reports bearing on disciplinary matters
received.

Suc"^ r ivlorsements may be one of approval,

disapproval or modification.

No r.-fuber or employee

shall alter or ct.i-se to be altered or withdraw any
disciplinary reoort.

Disciplinary reports in transit

through the chain of command shall not be delayed,
but must be reviewed, endorsed, and forxvarded as soon
as nossible.

Disciplinary reports shall be filed in

accordance with current departmental directives.
O.

Informing the Person Being Disciplined - The member
or employee beinq disciplined shall be informed of the
charges and penalties at the time such action is taken.

P.

Citizen Complaints Against Police Personnel
Complaints by citizens against members or employees

of this Department shall be processed in the following
manner:
1)

During Normal Business Hours - Such complaints
will be referred to the Chief unless it is of
such minor or invalid nature that the officer
first contacted can dispose of the incident
satisfactorily4

2)

Other Times - Outside normal business hours, the
officer receiving the complaint shall notify the
senior officer on duty who will take one of the
following actions:
a)

Instruct the receivinq officer to investigate

b)

Receive and investigate the complaint himself.

c)

Notify the Chief or commanding officer when he
feels such action is necessary.

Inyestigation^of

^ll^rr^cl Mi sronHnri* R p n n r f s Arr?H n^t*

Officers Any officer assigned the investigation of an alleged
act of misconduct on the part of a member or employee
of this Pepartment shall conduct a thorough and accurate
investigation.
Such investigation shall include formal statements from
all parties concerned, when necessary and pertinent,
the gathering and preservation* of any physical evidence
pertaining to the case, and all other information
bearing on the matter.
R.

Investigation Reports - The investigation of alleged
acts of misconduct must be reduced to writing and

include the following:
1)

A summary of the complaint or alleged act of
misconduct.

2)

Pertinent portions of the statements of all
parties to the incident*

3)

A description of the incident, physical evidence,
and other evidence important to the case.

4)

The observation and conclusions of the investigating
officer.

Distribution of Investigative Reports The report shall be distributed as follows by the
officer conductinq the investigation:
1)

Original to the Chief.

2)

Copy to the City Manager.

Actions That Can Result in Disciplinary Action If an investigation determines that an officer or
employee is guilty of any of the following offenses,
he shall be either reprimanded,

suspended, or dismissed;

according to the nature and seriousness of the offense:
1)

Willful violation of the rules, regulations, and
policies of the Department.

2)

Shielding the actions or abetting a fellow officer
in the violation of any law or departmental
regulation or policy.

3)

Insubordination, and/or the disrespect to a
superior officer.

4)

Failure to comply with the valid verbal orders of -a
superior officer.

5)

Failing to assist a fellow officer when requested,
in accomplishing an arrest or in serving a legal
process,

6)

Conduct subversive to the crood order and disciplin€
within—the—Department-.

7)

The use of disrespectful language toward or
concerning any fellow officer or an employee*

S)

Making derogatory remarks about other officers or
employees either to members of the Department or
to any person outside the Department unless it is
done as a formal statement to a superior officer or
an official investigative board.

9)

The tibe cr unnecessary violence or discourtesy
against a prisoner.

10)

Discourtesy toward any citizen.

11)

Incompetence or unwillingness to render satisfactory
service, as shown by performance evaluations below
satisfactory standards or as otherwise determined by
supervisory officers.

12)

Absence without leave or failure to notify the
proper authority concerning an absence.

13)

Falsely reporting reason for absence as being sick.

14)

Sleeping while on duty.

15)

Acts involving moral turpitude including immorality,
indecency, lewdness, or dishonesty.

16)

Intoxication and/or the use of intoxicating drugs
or beverages while on duty or at any time while
in uniform. No officer or employee shall appear on
duty in an unfit condition due to the comsumption of

alcohol! "Unfit condition" shall mean having
any measurable amount of alcohol in the blood.
17)

Undue familiarity with persons of bad repute.

18)

Failure to pay just debts.

19)

Knowingly allowing another person to use an
officer's badge and/or identification card.

(£o) Disclosure of confidential information to unauthorized persons.

T.

21)

Continued or gross neglect; of personal appearance,
of duty, or in the use of departmental materials
and equipment.

22)

Negligent or willful damage to City property.

23)

Failure to respond to proper assignments.

24)

Failure to submit proper reports.

25)

Failure to appear in Court at the proper time and
place after receiving notification of trial or
hearing.

26)

Failure to maintain a clean an^ functioning firearm.
This shall apply whether the weapon is personally
owned or issued by the Department.

27)

The acceptance of any gratuity.

23)

Conduct unbecoming a professional police officer
such as to brincj one's self, the City, or the
Department into disrepute.

29)

Other forms of misconduct as determined by the
administrative officials of the Deportment and
the City.

Actions That Shall Result in Direct Dismissal If an investigation determines that an officer or

is guilty of anv of the following offenses, he shall
be dismissed from the Department:
1)

Conviction of the violation of any ordinance,
statute, or law, the violation of which is considered to be a serious offense.

2)

The acceptance of mon^y or anything of value,
in consideration for refraining from taking proper
legal action against any person suspected of the
commission of a crime.

3)

The material falsification of an application for
employment.

4)

The use of bribery or political influence to secure
employment in the Department or advantages while
so employed.

Rehabilitation Whenever possible, personnel will be warned and
given an opportunity to innrove before dismissal is
made.
A member or officer may be claced on probation for a
specified nerio^ cf time if circumstances warrant it.
During this time, he wi] 1 be closely supervised and
evaluated with the hope of salvaging such individual.
Exit Interviews
p'xxt- interviews nay be hold -with -the Chief of PoliGe
if desired by the dismissed person.
Appeals A member of the Department may request a review of
disciplinary action by submitting a written request

to the Chief of Police. Additional appeal procedures
may be followed as outlined in the Richfield City
Personnel Policies and Procedures manual.
Dismissals are subject to appeal to the Richfield City
Appeals Board. Procedures for such appeals are outlined
in the Richfield City Personnel Folicies and Procedures
manual.
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Boyd A. WARD, Plaintiff and
Appellant,

v.
RICHFIELD CITY, a municipal
corporation, et al., Defendants
and Respondents.
No. 18431.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Aug. 16, 1984.
Rehearing Denied April 16, 1986.
Terminated city chief of police brought
action seeking to be reinstated and recover
damages. The Sixth District Court, Sevier
County, Don V. Tibbs, J., granted city's
motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction,
And chief appealed. The Supreme Court,
Howe, J., held that statute which deals
with appointment of chief of police in thirdclasn cities does not make removal of chief
of police in such cities free from all judicial
oversight, in light of statutes dealing with
removal of chief of police from first and
tecond class cities, which expressly make
•uch removal free from judicial review, and
thus, trial court had jurisdiction to review
action of city counsel of third class city in
firing chief of police.
Order set aside and case remanded
with directions.
I. Municipal Corporations «»182
U.C.A.1953, 10-3-909 to 10-3-911,
which respectively, require cities of first
**1 »econd class to create police depart"*tu*, vest board of commissioners with
**thority to prescribe administration of po* • department and to appoint head of de£**ent, and provide that chief of police
*t**ment may be removed by board of
^ i w i o n e r s without hearing or review
J £>urts, by their references to authority
^ ° ^ d of commissioners over police dej7^ e T \t, are limited to first and second
££**> i n which board of commissionm
_ ^
t; such statutes do not apply to
*-» deoartmo^fo
,v third-class
. u : ^ .,
,.,._
departments in
cities.

2. Statutes ®=»212.6
Statute is construed on assumption
that each term is used advisedly and that
intent of legislature is-revealed in use of
term in context and structure in which it is
placed.
3. Municipal Corporations <s=>182
U.C.A.1953,10-3-918, which deals with
appointment of chief of police in third-class
cities, does not make removal of chief of
police in such cities free from judicial oversight, in light of statutes dealing with removal of chief of police from first and
second class cities, which expressly make
such removal unreviewable, and thus, trial
court had jurisdiction to review action of
city counsel of third class city in firing
chief of police. U.C.A.1953, 10-3-911.

George E. Brown, Jr., Midvale, for plaintiff and appellant
Ken Chamberlain, Richfield, for defendants and respondents.
HOWE, Justice:
Plaintiff Boyd A. Ward appeals from an
order granting defendant Richfield City's
motion to dismiss his complaint for lack of
jurisdiction.
On April 2, 1981, Ward was terminated
as chief of police of the city of Richfield, a
third-class city, when the city council went
into a closed meeting to consider "other
business/' According to a stipulation
made by counsel for both sides, that action
was entered in the minutes after the closed
session concluded. On June 7, 1981, Ward
brought this action to be reinstated and to
recover damages alleging that the closed
meeting of the council had violated U.C.A.,
1953, § 52-4-1, et seq., commonly known
as the Open and Public Meetings Act He
also obtained a temporary restraining order
against Richfield City, restraining it from
taking any further action on the termination until the legality of its action could
„be decided by
, the district
,~. court Nevertheless, on June 8 the council in an open
meeting ratified its action of April 2. At a
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hearing for a preliminary injunction, Richfield City made a motion to dismiss plaintiffs complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
The court determined that pursuant to
U.C.A., 1953, § 10-3-911, it had no jurisdiction to review the act of the city council in
firing the chief of police and granted the
motion. That order is the sole issue before
us for review.
Section 10-3-911 provides in pertinent
part:
The chief of the police or fire department
of the cities may at any time be removed,
without a trial, hearing or opportunity to
be heard, by the board of commissioners
whenever in its opinion the good of the
service will be served thereby. Its action
in removing the chief of either department shall be final and conclusive and
shall not 6e receivetf or caffetf in question
before any court. [Emphasis added.]

In cities of the third class and in towns,
the governing body may appoint a chief
of police or marshal who shall exercise
and perform such duties as may be prescribed by the governing body. The
chief of police or marshal shall be under
the direction, control and supervision of
the mayor. The chief of police or marshal may, with the consent of the mayor,
appoint assistants to the chief of police
or marshal.
Conspicuously absent from this statute is
the provision contained in § 10-3-911 making the removal of a chief of police free
from all judicial oversight. "It probably is
Hot wholly inaccurate to suppose that ordinarily when people say one thing they do
not mean something else." 2A C. Sands,
Sutherland Statutory Construction, § 47.0l, as cited in Hansen v. Wilkinson, Utah;
Q58 P.2d 1216 (1983). We construe a statute on the assumption that each term is
Section 10-3-911 is preceded by § 10-3- Used advisedly and that the intent of the
909 mandating cities of the first and second Legislature is revealed in the use of the
class to create police departments and by term in the context and structure in which
§ 10-3-910 vesting the board of commis- it is placed.
sioners with authority to prescribe the adRichfield City relies on several cases to
ministration of the police departments by bolster its argument that stare decisis sup^
ordinance and to appoint the head of that ftorts a finding of no jurisdiction. It also
department. Under § 10-l-104(2)(a), the cites us to § 10-1-110 which directs that
governing body for cities of the first and statutes such as § 10-3-911 which were
second class is a city commission composed Enacted in 1977 as part of the "Utah Municof a mayor and four or two commissioners, ipal Code" should be construed as the con§ 10-3-103 and 104. Under § 10-1- tinuation of prior statutes so long as the
104(2Xb), the governing body for cities of Provisions are the same or substantially the
the third class is the city council composed Same. In Taylor v. Gunderson, 107 Utah
of a mayor and five councilmen, § 10-3- 437, 154 P.2d 653 (1944) we held that a
105.
town marshall of a third-class city could be
removed without cause. However, the
[1-3] It is readily apparent that §§ 10- statute then in force (U.C.A., 1943, § 15-^
3-909, 929 and 922 with their references to $2) was repealed by the enactment of the
the authority of the board of commission- 1977 Municipal Code and § 10-3-911 is in
ers over police departments unmistakably no wise substantially the same. In Skeen
refer to and are limited to first and second- v. Browning, 32 Utah 164, 89 P. 642 (1907).
class cities where boards of commissioners the statutes specifically made actions ofexist These sections were not intended by the mayor and city council in removing
the Legislature to apply to police depart- heads of police and fire departments final
ments in third-class cities such as Richfield. and nonreviewable. Sec. 8, p. 46, Act 1899r
Police departments in third-class cities and Ih State t/. Stavar, Utah, 578 P.2d 847
towns are dealt with separately in § 10-3- (1978) we did not reach the issue presented
918, which provided at the time this case ih the instant case. None of these cases to
arose:
helpful here.
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The order dismissing plaintiffs complaint for lack of jurisdiction was in error
and is set aside. The case is remanded to
the trial court with directions to allow
plaintiff to proceed on the merits of his
case. Costs are awarded to appellant
HALL, C.J., and STEWART and DURHAM, JJ., concur.
ZIMMERMAN, J., does not participate
herein.
ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
Richfield City has petitioned for rehearing pointing out that the court's opinion did
not cite nor rely upon Jolley v. Lindon
City, Utah, 684 P.2d 47 (1984). fe acknowledge our oversight That case, too,
involved the firing of the chief of police in
a third class city. However, the contention
there made by the appellant chief of police
was that U.C.A., 1953, § 10-3-911 could
not apply to him because he was discharged for investigating a city councilman
in his official duties. The contention was
not there made, as in the instant case, that
section 10-3-911 does not in any instance
apply to chiefs of police in third class cities.
In a per curiam opinion, we held that since
aection 10-3-911 contained no exceptions, it
was inconsequential why the chief was dismissed. We also found lacking merit the
appellant's contention that the city council
had not formally dismissed him. Again, no
contention was made that the city council
lacked that statutory power.
After careful consideration of the appellant's petition for rehearing, we deny it and
overrule Jolley v. Lindon City, supra, in«ofar as our decision in that case conflicts
*ith our opinion in the instant case. Furthermore, we have carefully examined
Chapter 3 of Title 10 and have found that
J* each instance when the term "Board of
Commissioners" is used, it refers only to
the governing body of cities of the first and
»<*ond class. We can find no instance in
wh
»ch that term was used to refer to the
jtoverning body of cities generally, include s a city council in a third class city. In
Chapter 3, the term "governing body" is

consistently used (over seventy-five times)
when reference is made to cities generally,
that is, of all three classes.
The petition for rehearing is denied.
ZIMMERMAN, J., did not participate
herein.
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S.H. BENNION, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
GULF OIL CORPORATION, a Pennsylvania corporation, and the Utah State
Board of Oil, Gas and Mining, an agency of the State of Utah, Defendants and
Respondents.
No. 19144.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Aug. 19, 1985.
Rehearing Denied March 21, 1986.
Nonconsenting mineral interest owner
appealed order of Board of Oil, Gas, and
Mining which designated second well on oil
drilling unit as the production well and
which ordered nonconsenting owner to pay
proportionate share of drilling cost The
Third District Court, Salt Lake County,
Timothy Hanson, J., entered summary
judgment in favor of oil producer and
Board, and nonconsenting owner appealed.
The Supreme Court, Howe, J., held that
Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining had no authority to allow test well to displace production well from common source of supply
on oil drilling unit and to charge nonconsenting mineral interest owner for proportionate share of cost of drilling.
Board's order vacated and remanded
with instruction.
Stewart, J., concurred in result

